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1ABSTRACT
As most of the rest of Latin America, Ecuador engaged in major economic re-
forms in the 1990s, involving a freeing of its external trade and capital account regime
as well as drastic domestic financial reforms. The liberalization process in Ecuador
took place in an environment of strong external shocks, declining oil prices and the El
Niño events among them. Trade liberalization got underway in 1990-92 under the flag
of the Andean Pact, with capital market liberalization and a privatization scheme fol-
lowing soon after. Fiscal policy was tight until 1996, and then relaxed.
The effects of the package involved some structural adjustment with productiv-
ity growth in the traded goods sector. Most efficiency gains are achieved though in the
traditional export sectors (including oil). Nevertheless, the more eventful aspects of
economic performance during the 1990s is linked to external shocks and macroeco-
nomic policies. Greater price stabilization was achieved in the first half of the 1990s,
with some demand expansion and employment growth after 1996 due to the fiscal
stimulus. The real exchange rate appreciated steadily after 1990. Part of the fiscal im-
balance was due to combined adverse effects of declining terms of trade and exchange
appreciation on public receipts from the oil sector. In real terms, the fiscal balance was
positive in the late 1990s, but negative in nominal terms because of the price shifts.
Effective demand was led by exports, with direct foreign investment helping
build capacity in the oil sector. Despite liberalization and appreciation, the import share
of GDP did not go up.
Productivity increased in sectors with relatively high output/labour ratios (oil,
manufacturing) and fell elsewhere (especially other services. Informal employment
rates rose in urban areas as the skill-intensity of production in traded goods went up.
These changes were sharper in the early 1990s as intra-Andean group exports increased
with Ecuador gaining competitive edge in particular manufactured intermediate goods
and luxury consumption goods.
The share of wage earners in the labour force declined, while self-employment
income as a proportion of value-added went up. Similar to patterns found elsewhere in
Latin America, there was a trend toward greater wage inequality. Urban poverty, how-
ever, declined during the period 1992-97, perhaps because of changes in macro policy.
Unfortunately, this trend was to be short-lived. By the end of 1998, external vulner-
ability and reduced fiscal discipline had pushed the external and public sector deficits
to unprecedented heights. A currency crisis, a banking crisis, and a surge in inflation
2followed in 1999 (in part because the financial sector was liberalized when it was virtu-
ally bankrupt and could only live off continued borrowing from the central bank). As
this paper shows, the liberalization episode did not budge the Ecuadorian economy
from its historical position of being an unstable raw material exporter.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Ecuador’s economic reform process started late. Market-oriented reforms were
implemented in earnest starting around 1992 with the liberalization of trade and capital
flows. Adjustment policies in the 1980s in response to the debt crisis and falling oil
prices had focused on short-term economic stabilization with only isolated and some-
times short-lived attempts at reforms of the protectionist trade regime. Historically, Ec-
uador’s economy always seems to have survived difficult periods being ‘bailed-out’ by
new primary export booms. High adjustment costs had to be paid in the 1980s, but
cushions were found in the surge of shrimp farming, expansion of oil production and
recovery of its position as the world’s major banana exporter. This likely has been a
factor in slowing the necessary policy reform process and has kept the economy highly
vulnerable to shocks in world demand and commodity prices.
Major reforms to the policy regime were implemented in the 1990s. Nonethe-
less, a main conclusion of this paper is that at the turn of the century the Ecuadorian
economy is still struggling to achieve macroeconomic stability, where volatile oil
prices and the external debt overhang continue to be key determinants of the fiscal and
external adjustment process. Plus ça change? Some important changes are observed
including a significant growth of non-traditional exports. Further, substantial volume
shifts are observed in the macroeconomic balance. The real trade balance has moved to
large surplus positions, while the real primary fiscal balance has also moved into sur-
plus as a consequence of large cuts in the volume of government services. Adverse
relative price shifts (falling terms of trade, real exchange rate appreciation) have made
this adjustment look much less impressive in value terms and left the economy with
persistent internal and external deficits. Vulnerability to external shocks, particularly
commodity price volatility, remains one of the main weaknesses of the economy.
Underlying the large volume adjustments are production shifts towards greater
export orientation. On balance, there has been a shift towards more capital-intensive
production (oil, manufacturing, traditional agriculture), with the exception of a few ag-
ricultural sub-sectors (flowers, vegetables).  The low productivity growth that can be
observed in the 1990s seems largely due to this sectoral shift, producing a relative de-
cline in the overall demand for modern sector labour in the traded goods sector. The
smaller demand for wage labour has become more skill-intensive, giving rise to larger
wage inequality and income differential between wage and self-employed incomes. The
weight of employment growth has been in informal and self-employed jobs. Together
2with dramatic decreases in the real wage it has shifted factor income distribution away
from wages and towards self-employed incomes. This distributional pattern was al-
ready predominant in the 1980s when the recession and real wage declines pushed the
wage share to very low levels. In the 1990s, the greater share of workers seems to have
moved into the informal sector, but recovery of real wages allowed for a reversal in the
downward trend of the wage share. Moreover, urban household incomes move closely
with adjustments in the institutionally set modern-sector minimum wage. This correla-
tion appears to be associated with two factors: most wages and salaries in the modern
sector are linked to the minimum wage and urban self-employed incomes benefit from
strong multiplier effects of real wage increases. The upshot has been declining urban
poverty rates since 1992 with the wage adjustment likely being more important than
structural economic change. In 1998-9, the economy was doubly hit by a steep decline
in the oil price and the natural disaster provoked by the El Niño phenomenon. The en-
suing fiscal and financial crisis revealed structural weaknesses of the economy and
policy failures of the past. Rising inflation and falling employment undid the gains in
urban poverty reduction in the preceding years.
The analytics of the apparent unorthodox outcome of adjustment in 1990-97 is
complex. To simplify we could use the diagrammics of Figures 1a and b (derived from
Taylor et al. 1998) as a starting point. The graphs provide a link between macroeco-
nomic adjustment, sectoral productivity shifts and the labour market. The northwest
quadrant assumes an increasing relationship between the output level and the trade
deficit. Operating through reduced protection and appreciation of the real exchange
rate, balance of payments opening may well have shifted this schedule outward. Cur-
rent account liberalization led to a bigger trade deficit; the deterioration was made
worse by real appreciation induced by increased capital inflows and stabilization poli-
cies using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, beginning around 1992. In the north-
east quadrant, liberalization may well have led to less demand for formal employment
at a given level of output. Pressures toward cost reduction via enhanced labour produc-
tivity in tradable goods sectors along with growth of demand for relatively low-skilled
jobs in non-traded sectors helped push this trend. As shown in the southeast quadrant, a
reduction in formal employment is likely to be associated with an increase in informal
jobs, greater self-employment, and, given wage rigidity in formal sectors, higher unem-
ployment. In stylized fashion, liberalization coupled with capital inflows initially led to
productivity growth and a reduction in formal employment in a move from A to B.  At
3the same time, the trade deficit worsened, jumping from X to Y. To avoid further wid-
ening of the external disequilibrium and slash domestic inflation, authorities pushed
toward fiscal austerity to cut back on aggregate demand and encourage further capital
inflows. Output growth slowed, with formal employment decreasing during a policy-
induced transition from B to C; at the same time, the trade deficit was contained in a
move from Y to Z. We hypothesize that the story of Figure 1a, reflects in stylized
fashion the events following the stabilization efforts and the trade and capital account
opening of the Ecuadorian economy in the early 1990s.
After 1995 (till mid-1998), fiscal discipline slipped and new rounds of wage in-
creases were allowed, pushing domestic demand and the external deficit back in the
direction of Z’ (in Figure 1b). Falling oil prices compounded the effect on the external
balance. Demand expansion allowed for a recovery of formal employment (particularly
in non-tradables) to B’.
The story could be formalized and elaborated further in an dependent-economy
model framework with labour and commodity market imperfections (including, formal-
sector wage rigidity, labour market segmentation and mark-up pricing in formal sec-
tors), along lines developed in, for instance, Cox-Edwards and Edwards (1994) and Ros
(1999). In these stories, if the non-tradables is the more labour-intensive sector (as is
the case in Ecuador), then trade liberalization will reduce employment. Extending this
to an intertemporal framework, Cox-Edwards and Edwards (1994), show that capital
account liberalization in an economy with minimum wage setting in the formal sector
will lead to an increase in non-tradables employment through a positive expenditure
effect (along the lines of Figure 1b).
These theoretical notions emphasize the importance of the starting conditions of
the liberalizing economy, particularly factor endowments (including human capital and
natural resources) and labour market imperfections, in predicting the probable out-
comes of balance of payments liberalization on output and employment. In this paper,
we will not flesh out the theoretical notions in further detail, but rather keep the broader
framework in mind when assessing trends in aggregate demand, employment and in-
come distribution in Ecuador before and after the economic reforms.
This story is detailed in the next sections. First, in Section 2, the major policy
changes and economic events since the early 1980s are summarized. In Section 3, the
principal shifts in the macroeconomic balances and sectoral employment and produc-
tivity rates during the key period of economic reforms (1988-98) are analyzed follow-
4ing the decomposition methodologies as suggested in Taylor et al. (1998). Section 4
analyzes the consequences of the employment shifts for earnings and factor distribution
and develops some hypotheses as to how this has affected income distribution and pov-
erty at the household level. Due to data limitations this analysis is mainly confined to
urban areas. Conclusions are in Section 5.
Figure 1a
Output and employment responses to macroeconomic adjustment policies and balance
of payments liberalization: opening and demand contraction
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Output and employment responses to macroeconomic adjustment policies and balance
of payments liberalization: opening and demand expansion
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6Table 1: Ecuador: Policy Regimes, 1982-98
Stabilization programme
 1982-3
Adjustment programme
 1988-90
Stabilization Plan
 1992
Economic Reactivation Pro-
gram
1998-2000
(implementation in progress;
major amendments during
1999)
Trade reforms Increase in import restrictions Tariff reductions and reduction
of QR  in context of Andean
Pact. Average tariff at 13%.
Further tariff reductions, 5-25%
tariff range (with exceptions for
luxury consumption goods)
Reorganization and stricter con-
trol of customs
Exchange rate regime Crawling peg introduced Crawling peg and periodical
devaluations to align real ex-
change rate
Managed floating within fixed
upper and lower boundaries
Managed floating. Maxi-
devaluation (15% in September
1998). Flexible exchange rate
introduced in February 1999
following effective 100% de-
valuation. During rest of 1999
another effective 100% nominal
devaluation. Shift towards dol-
larization announced in January
2000.
Capital account Direct foreign investment and
regulated through Acuerdo 24 of
Andean Pact. No foreign in-
vestment allowed in oil and
mining.
In 1984 restrictions of DFI were
abandoned and foreign invest-
ment in oil exploration permit-
ted. Some controls on DFI re-
established in 1988. Elimination
of tax advantages for foreign
investors. Strict tendering rules
for DFI in oil sector.
Ley Liberalización de Flujos de
Capital e Inversión of 1992: full
capital account liberalization
Fully liberalized
External debt Debt renegotiated with commer-
cial banks and Paris Club. Pri-
vate sector debt nationalized
(“sucretización”).
Cap on interest payments (30%
of exports) set unilaterally (be-
fore, 1987, default on all debt
obligations). New Paris Club
agreement in 1990.
Agreement on Brady Plan terms
and new Paris Club agreement
Partial default on US T-bill
guaranteed Brady Bonds in
September 2000. Creditors de-
clare Ecuador in full default.
7Stabilization programme
 1982-3
Adjustment programme
 1988-90
Stabilization Plan
 1992
Economic Reactivation Pro-
gram
1998-2000
(implementation in progress;
major amendments during
1999)
Financial sector
 reform
No reform. Fixed interest rates. Interest-rate liberalization,
 maximum spread set
Further financial liberalization
and reduction of financial re-
pression. Modernization of
banking legislation. Some, but
slight improvement banking
supervision.
Consolidation financial reforms.
Introduction of deposit insurance
system. Recapitalization and bad
debt take over of range of ailing
commercial banks. Creation of
independent Central Bank. Fi-
nancial crisis of 1999 leads to
freezing of bank deposits, bank-
ruptcy and nationalization of
major domestic banks by deposit
insurance agency (AGD). Inter-
est rates kept high in attempt to
avoid capital flight.
Fiscal policies and
reforms
Spending cuts and rise state-
controlled energy prices. No
fiscal reform.
Spending cuts and rise of state-
controlled energy prices. Elimi-
nation of wheat subsidy. Modest
first steps towards tax reform.
Fiscal cuts. Elimination of gaso-
line price subsidy.
Further, minor tax reforms
(customs and tax collection).
Fiscal restraint. Freeze of public
sector wages.
Major tax reform: introduction
1% tax on financial transactions,
(temporary) suspension of in-
come and profit tax. VAT in-
crease (from 10 to 12%).
Domestic prices Domestic price controls and sub-
sidies on basic commodities.
Gradual liberalization of some
controlled prices.
Liberalization of most domestic
prices.
Elimination of subsidy on natu-
ral gas and electricity. Compen-
sation through (targeted)  “pov-
erty bonus”.
Wage policies Minimum wages. Incidental
nominal wage increases due to
social pressure.
Minimum wages. Incidental
nominal wage increases due to
social pressure.
Minimum wages. Negotiated
wage adjustments with target to
maintain or increase purchasing
power.
Unchanged minimum wage leg-
islation. Temporary wage freeze.
8Stabilization programme
 1982-3
Adjustment programme
 1988-90
Stabilization Plan
 1992
Economic Reactivation Pro-
gram
1998-2000
(implementation in progress;
major amendments during
1999)
Labour market reform No. Protective labour legislation
enforced mainly in small seg-
ment of large-scale modern sec-
tor. Weak enforcement mini-
mum wages.
No. Protective labour legislation
enforced mainly in small seg-
ment of large-scale modern sec-
tor. Weak enforcement mini-
mum wages. Attempts at reform
fail. Dismissal of public employ-
ees but at high severance pay-
ments.
No. Protective labour legislation
enforced mainly in small seg-
ment of large-scale modern sec-
tor. Weak enforcement mini-
mum wages.
No. Protective labour legislation
enforced mainly in small seg-
ment of large-scale modern sec-
tor. Weak enforcement mini-
mum wages. Flexibilization of
labour laws announced as part
of dollarization plan (January
2000)
Privatizations No No Initiation of privatization pro-
gramme (airlines, cement, fer-
tilizers)
Speeding up of privatization
programme announced (tele-
communications, oil and en-
ergy).
92. THE ‘STOP-GO’ PROCESS OF STABILIZATION AND OPENING OF 
THE ECONOMY
Ecuador has been a slow reformer. During the 1980s adjustment predominantly
focused on short-term economic stabilization, despite ‘stop-go’ rhetoric to liberalize the
economy along lines of the Washington consensus (see Table 1 for an overview of the
major policy regime changes since 1982). As analyzed in Jácome, Larrea and Vos
(1998), economic stability remained a main concern of policy makers due to a succes-
sion of external shocks and erratic macroeconomic policies. In fact, by the end of the
decade the inflation rate reached in post-war high (75% in 1989) and substantial fiscal
and current account deficits were main symptoms of overall economic instability. Both
the fiscal balance and the external account have remained highly sensitive to oil price
shocks and the external debt overhang. No major trade reform was undertaken to over-
haul the 30-year old import substitution regime. Instead, import restrictions were the
major response to the pressure of the debt overhang to produce trade surpluses. The
fixed-exchange rate regime was abandoned in 1983 and replaced by a crawling peg
with periodical maxi-devaluations to align the real exchange rate, but multiple ex-
change rates continued to exist until the early 1990s. In effect, the traditional compo-
nents of stabilization policies – fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies – made up
the toolbox of policy instruments applied in a stop-go pattern by successive govern-
ments. Responses to external shocks, IMF pressure and ever-returning populist tenden-
cies determined switches between sub-periods of fiscal and monetary restraint and of
macroeconomic expansion. In all, the overall structure of the economy underwent little
structural change. Primary income distribution moved against (urban) wage earners,
while there was a strong increase in the share of self-employment income in the infor-
mal sector. This distributional shift is explained by the continued squeeze of modern
sector wages, employment losses in modern urban sectors (both traded and non-traded)
and the consequent push of workers into the residual informal sector employment
(Jácome, Larrea & Vos 1998). Modern sector enterprise profits were also affected by
the economic crisis and barely could maintain its share in value added, despite the steep
fall in the wage share (see below).
Pressures towards more substantial reforms were resisted until the early 1990s.
Also the regime of president Leon Febres Cordero (1984-88), which had entered gov-
ernment with a strong neo-liberal rhetoric, did not achieve major economic reforms.
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The regime started on a note of severe fiscal and monetary restraint, but ended with a
populist tune. Inflation accelerated to record heights towards the end of the decade.
The only major reform of the regime was the removal of restrictions on direct
foreign investment as regulated through the Andean pact (Acuerdo 24) and the opening
of oil and mining sector to foreign investors. The latter helped to boost oil production.
Oil exports were the driving force behind the high growth in the 1970s, albeit with
typical Dutch-disease effects (Vos 1989), and remained a cushion during the 1980s.
Opening of the oil sector to foreign investors helped to expand production capacity and
eased the adjustment cost of oil price fluctuations. The management of oil revenues as a
macroeconomic stabilization device is shown by the pattern in Figure 2, where oil
prices and production show inverse trends. The need to accommodate oil production
and exports to meet fiscal targets eventually forced Ecuador to give up its membership
of OPEC in 1992 (Sierra 1995). The policy secured a level of oil exports at US$ 1.2
billion per year and maintained fiscal dependence on oil revenues (Figure 3), but – as
indicated – failed to ensure stability.
Figure 2:
Ecuador: Crude oil export production and the oil price, 1987-1998
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The external debt overhang was a major source of fiscal problems. Successive
debt rescheduling brought little relief. Instead, the Central Bank took over most of the
private external debt (labeled as the ‘sucretización’), along with a number of bad debts
of ailing private banks. The upshot was growing operational losses of the Central Bank.
Izurieta (1999) has estimated these losses, also labeled as the quasi-fiscal deficit, at 1 or
2 % of GDP during the 1980s, adding to already large non-financial public sector defi-
cits (see Figure 4). However, when estimated by changes in the full net worth, the ‘hy-
pothetical’ quasi-deficit increased to over 20% of GDP in 1987-8 due to the dramatic
increase in the net external liability position of the Central Bank valued in domestic
currency.2 This is labeled the hypothetical deficit here, as firstly the Central Bank did
not show the appropriate asset revaluation in its balance sheets and, secondly, the gov-
ernment opted to default on all its external debt obligations in 1987 and only part of the
gap was monetized.
Figure 3
Ecuador: Public sector revenue
 (% of GDP)
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       Source:  Appendix Table A.1
                                                
2 The Central Bank losses are estimated here as the change in net worth. The quasi-deficit does not in-
clude changes in net worth due to revaluation of assets and liabilities. The ‘hypothetical’ quasi-deficit
does include the revaluation. See Izurieta (1999) for the data and estimation methodology.
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The centre-left government of Rodrigo Borja (1988-92) was left to deal with
this enormous fiscal problem and record-high inflation, which reached a rate of over
80% at the end of 1988. It promised to tackle the problems through an adjustment pro-
gram that would be neither ‘orthodox’ not ‘heterodox’ and in the end turned out to have
a little bit of everything.  Stabilization measures were very similar to the 1982-3 ad-
justment program which counted with the IMF’s seal of approval. Fiscal policies were
initially restrictive, but cuts were not enough to bring inflation below an annual rate of
50%. The crawling peg exchange rate regime was sustained with periodical maxi-
devaluations.  Further orthodox measures included a (gradual) liberalization of (some)
controlled domestic prices and a liberalization of interest rates (albeit subject to a
maximum spread between deposit and lending rates). The regime of institutional wage
setting in the modern sector (largely through minimum wage legislation) and a complex
system of bonuses and cost-of-living compensation was maintained. Attempts to sim-
plify the system for public sector employees failed because of resistance of trade unions
and the government bureaucracy itself. Real wages continued their decline that began
in the early 1980s, as nominal wage adjustments to inflation were partial and lagged.
With respect to the balance of payments, the Borja regime reinstated some of
the controls on direct foreign investment with strict tendering rules for the oil and min-
ing sector and elimination of tax advantages to foreign investors to put them at the
same footing as domestic investors. Debt servicing payments were resumed after rene-
gotiation of the Paris Club debt and restructuring of commercial debt.
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Figure 4
Ecuador: Fiscal and Quasi-Fiscal Deficit, 1980-91
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Trade liberalization was the major reform measure and was implemented be-
tween 1990 and 1992. The push came largely from outside, as the Initiative for the
Americas pushed for greater integration and economic liberalization of the Western
Hemisphere. With the emergence of NAFTA and Mercosur, the countries of the An-
dean Pact tried to revive their free trade zone and average nominal import tariffs were
reduced from 39% to 15%.3
A more ambitious set of economic liberalization measures came with the gov-
ernment of Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-96). The trade reform was deepened and nominal
tariffs were reduced further to a 0-35% range and the weighted average tariff fell to
around 9% (see Table A.1). Fiscal policies were tightened more rigorously and the in-
flation rate could be halved to 25% in 1996. The exchange rate regime shifted to a sys-
tem of managed floating within a pre-established band. It was Ecuador’s way of at-
tempting to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor to cut inflationary expectations.
This succeeded only partially and as consequence the real exchange rate appreciated by
                                                
3 Tariff reduction also involved reduction of the dispersion in tariff rates across commodities. The tariff
reform  included a reduction of the upper and lower limits of nominal tariffs from 0% and 290% to 0%
and 35%, respectively.  This substantially reduced the difference between Ecuador's tariffs and those of
the rest of the world and eliminated the dissimilarity between Ecuador’s tariff structure and that of the
other countries of the Andean region (Creamer, Kim and Reynolds 1997).
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some 15% between 1992 and 1996 (see Figure 5). Besides the trade liberalization, a
series of structural reforms in other areas were initiated.
Figure 5
The capital account was now fully liberalized under the Ley de Liberalización
de Flujos de Capital e Inversión of September 1992. Simultaneously, the domestic fi-
nancial sector was liberalized and (modest) steps were taken to improve the system of
bank supervision and regulation. The politically controversial subsidy on domestic fuel
prices was eliminated, but those on other basic utilities (such as, electricity, cooking
gas, water and housing) remained in tact. Although the benefits of these subsidies
mainly accrue to the urban middle and higher income groups (World Bank 1996), at-
tempts to liberalize these prices were successfully opposed by organized labour. A legal
framework for the privatization of state enterprises was put in place, which led to the
privatization of the national airline company (Ecuatoriana), one cement company, a
fertilizer factory and a sugar refinery. In the aggregate, these only represent a small
share of the public enterprise sector. Institutional reforms in other areas directed at a
modernization of the state were formulated, but only very modest progress was made
during the Duran government.
Most progress with the reforms was made during 1993 and 1994 with the new
trade and exchange rate regimes being the central features. An important achievement
in 1995 was a substantial debt-reduction negotiated with commercial creditors in the
Ecuador: External Prices and Real Exchange Rate
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framework of the Brady plan. This helped reduce the external public debt burden from
88% of GDP in 1994 to 78% in 1995.
This positive event was counteracted by successive exogenous shocks, which
affected the policy reform process as much at it hurt the economy between 1995 and
1997. Early 1995 there was an armed border conflict with Peru, which diverted atten-
tion from the economic adjustment process. Later that year, a corruption scandal led to
the fled abroad of the main architect of the economic reforms and head of the economic
team, Alberto Dahik, who also held the office of Vice-President of Ecuador. This
brought political instability and with elections upcoming in 1996, economic populism
returned leading to a more expansionary fiscal stance. The elections were won by the
populist, former mayor of Guayaquil, Abdala Bucaram. The new regime was short
lived. Bucaram was ousted from office in February 1997, barely six months after com-
ing to power. While elected on a populist platform, Bucaram’s main economic advisor
was Domingo Cavallo who designed a stringent austerity program and proposed the
introduction of a currency board following the Argentine model. Nothing of this actu-
ally converted to policies. Instead, widespread corruption and general chaos in the pub-
lic administration provoked the mobilization of political forces early 1997 and Bucaram
went into exile.
After a short period of enormous political confusion, the allied political forces
installed the speaker of Congress, Fabian Alarcon, as interim president. The new re-
gime initiated a process of constitutional reforms, but in the economic sphere essen-
tially proved to be, at best, a care-taker government. It did re-establish better fiscal and
monetary control which, however, would be frustrated by two new exogenous shocks: a
steep fall in oil prices and the natural disaster caused by the El Niño phenomenon in
1997-8. The direct cost of the drop in oil prices amounted to 1.0% of GDP in 1997 and
2.7% in 1998. The estimated foregone earnings4 in agriculture, transportation and
commerce due to El Niño have been estimated to lie somewhere between 1.1% of 1998
GDP (Vos et al. 1998) and 10% of GDP (Cepal 1998). Obviously, even when taking
the lower estimate, this gave a severe economic set back with the non-financial public
                                                
4 That is, only prospective value added losses are included in these numbers. Capital losses,  reconstruc-
tion costs of damaged infrastructure, costs of evacuations, health care or lost lives, and so on are not con-
sidered here, but see Vos, Velasco and De Labastida (1998) for an analysis of the economic and social
costs of the weather shock.
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sector deficit climbing to 6.1% of GDP and the external deficit to 11.9% in 1998, up
from a fiscal deficit of 3.0% and an external surplus of 0.6% of GDP in 1996.
The Economic Reactivation Program of president Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000)
promised a resumption of the reform process initiated in 1992. Trade and capital ac-
count liberalization will be consolidated and complemented with further institutional
reforms (such as a reform of the customs administration and a tax reform). Further, the
Central Bank has been reformed to an independent monetary authority and a new law to
regulate the ailing domestic financial sector is announced. The process of privatization
of public enterprises is to be speeded up, in particular in the telecommunications and
energy sectors. As has been the case with all previous programs, the overwhelming ini-
tial concern of the Reactivation Program is again with short-run economic instability.
Oil prices have collapsed and most of the reconstruction costs of the damages caused
by El Niño still have to be carried. The fiscal deficit for 1998 is back to the level of a
decade ago when macroeconomic instability reached its most difficult point. Spending
cuts and a nominal wage freeze have returned as the conventional adjustment measures.
The politically sensitive subsidies on natural gas and electricity have been eliminated
and a modest targeted income transfer program (the “Bono Solidario”) was put in place
to compensate low income groups for the implied income loss. The exchange rate sys-
tem of managed floating is maintained, although a maxi-devaluation of 15% in Sep-
tember 1998 was required to realign the real exchange rate somewhat (see Figure 5).
Brazil’s economic problems early 1999 led monetary authorities to raise short-term in-
terest rates to 190% in an attempt to stem capital flight and a speculative attack on the
sucre. The effort had to fail because (a) Ecuador lacks a market for domestic and inter-
national portfolio capital that could respond to the interest rate adjustment; and (b) the
interest-rate hike led to a domestic credit crush and put the long, latently insolvent
banking sector into a state of panic.5  The currency crisis thus became self-fulfilling and
the exchange rate collapsed in February 1999, ensuing high inflation and a full-blown
economic and financial crisis. The bank crisis revealed the high indebtedness in dollar-
denominated liabilities of the financial system, as well as its exposure to dollar-
denominated assets outstanding with borrowers earning in domestic currency. The de
                                                
5 See Izurieta (1998) for an in-depth analysis of the factors underlying the financial sector fragility built
up already in the 1970s and 1980s, with virtually all commercial banks relying on subsidized Central
Bank loans to maintain liquidity.
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valuation and the reduced capacity of the Central Bank to act as a lender of last resort
tilted an already fragile system over the edge. Eight banks were declared bankrupt in
February-March and, to avoid bank runs, deposits of all banks were frozen for 6 to 12
months. During the year several major domestic banks failed and its deposits were
taken over by the deposit insurance agency (AGD). Inflation accelerated to 65% by the
end of 1999 and GDP would fall by 7.3% in 1999. As the first country ever, Ecuador
defaulted on payments on its Brady bonds in September 1999. However, this step nor
the recovery of oil prices could stem the process towards a deepening of the crisis. The
urban unemployment rate doubled to 14.5% during 1999, real wages lost 25% of their
purchasing power and the dollar value of the minimum wage dropped to US$ 40 per
month. Negotiations with the IMF for a stand-by loan were delayed because of political
obstructionism in the Ecuadorian congress halting for long the passing of a reform to
the bank legislation and a reform of the VAT. In January 2000, with no agreement with
the IMF yet signed, nervousness in the exchange market, leads to the bold step of an-
nouncing a dollarization of the economy in an attempt to provide more credibility to
financial policies. Also president Mahuad required such a bold step in an attempt to re-
gain political credibility. To no avail it soon proved. An Indian uprising mid-January
2000 received military support leading to the ousting of the president. US pressure pre-
vented the odd alliance of the Indian popular movement and the armed forces to form
an unconstitutional junta and Vice-President Noboa would be sworn in as president
only a day after the uprising.
In sum, the 1990s witnessed important attempts at economic liberalization.
Trade was close to fully liberalized by 1992 (with high tariffs only applying to a limited
number of luxury consumption goods). At the same time, also the capital account and
domestic financial sector were liberalized and a dirty floating exchange rate regime was
established. Subsidies on domestic prices of basic commodities have now been elimi-
nated, although successive governments only dared to take one or two at a time.
In other areas, reforms have been less far-reaching. In particular, the labour re-
gime remained virtually unchanged throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Wage setting in
the modern sector is governed by the minimum wage legislation. Base wages are set in
reference to the minimum wage. In the modern sector, there is a large wedge between
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the take-home wage and the base wage as a result of a complex system of mandated
benefits, including thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth month salaries, a cost-
of-living allowance, a complementary bonus and a transportation bonus. Some are a
function of the minimum wage, some are lump-sum amounts, making administration
and budget control a complex process. Some of the mandated benefits have been added
over time as an alternative to an institutionalized wage-indexation system. This wedge,
at the level of the minimum wage, has been increasing over time reaching 700% in
1998. Labour costs further include a 21.5% social security tax, which is calculated over
the base wage, excluding mandated benefits. Job security provisions present another
potential source of labour costs. Severance payments for ‘unjustified’ dismissal are
0.25 monthly salaries per year of service.
This cumbersome labour legislation has a potentially highly distortive effect on
labour markets. Yet, enforcement of labour legislation is very weak and, as analyzed by
Cox-Edwards (1996), the actual additional costs of compliance with labour laws are in
effect the order of magnitude of 8 percent when comparing wage costs of complying
and non-complying firms. Thus the cost created by labour market regulations is not as
heavy as they may seem at first glance. This could explain why corporate enterprise
managers do not see labour laws as a major concern for their firm’s operations
(Hachette & Franklin 1991). Compliance to labour legislation is mainly confined to the
small segment of large companies. Moreover, as analyzed further below, the share of
wages in total production costs has fallen substantially during 1982-1998 has fallen
dramatically in nearly all economic sectors (except financial services). Hence, the em-
ployment effects (both in terms of creation and relocation) of a liberalization of the la-
bour market are likely to be small.
All in all, starting 1992 Ecuador did make a serious move towards the type of
economic reforms implemented elsewhere in the region. Yet it may be symptomatic
that the names of the reform programs ever since the debt crisis of the early 1980s have
been titled ‘stabilization’ or ‘economic reactivation’ plans, rather than structural reform
programs (cf. Table 1). In effect, macroeconomic stabilization problems have remained
on the forefront, not in the least because vulnerability to external shocks, in particular
oil prices seems to have remained as strong as ever before. This could hint at the fact
that little actual structural change has occurred. As we shall see in the following sec-
tions, some real change occurred, however without being able to cure the fundamentals
that underpin the stabilization problems and persistent income inequality of Ecuador’s
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economy. Though the analysis stops in 1998, the events leading to the major economic
crisis at the turn of the century merely reflect the prevailing fundamental weaknesses of
Ecuador’s economy nothwithstanding the attempts at liberalization.
3. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: LIBERALIZATION WITH LITTLE 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT?
What structural adjustment?: (I) Demand decomposition
Economic growth during 1988-98 averaged a dismal 2.7% per annum, with no
notable difference between the pre- and post-liberalization periods (1988-91 and 1992-
98). Hence the economic reforms so far have failed to enhance the overall growth rate.
The drive towards liberalization has made the growth rate more dependent on exports.
After accounting for multiplier effects, the contribution of exports to real aggregate
demand increased from 48% in 1988 to 60% in the post-liberalization period (see Table
2). This export drive largely went at cost of government spending, which contribution
fell from 30 to 20%. The contribution of private investment remained stable and failed
to recover from its decline during the adjustment in the 1980s.
The above conclusion is derived from a simple decomposition methodology of
effective demand (Taylor et al. 1998). Aggregate supply (X) can be defined as the sum
of private incomes (YP), net taxes (T) and imports (M):
(1) X = YP + T + M
The aggregate supply and demand balance can be written as:
(2) X = CP + IP + G + E
i.e., the sum of private consumption, private investment, government spending and ex-
ports. Leakage parameters can be defined as a function of aggregate output, yielding
the private savings rate as sP = (YP – C)/X; the import propensity as m = M/X and the
tax rate as t = T/X. From this one gets the typical Keynesian income multiplier func-
tion:
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and where IP/sP, G/t and E/m can be interpreted as the direct “own” multiplier effects
on output of private investment, government spending and export injections with their
overall impact via the corresponding “leakages”  (respectively, savings, tax and import
propensities). Results for the 1988-98 period are given in Table 2 and are estimated
using national accounts data at constant prices.
The decomposition methodology also allows to analyze the direct “own” multi-
plier effects on aggregate demand of shifts in the volume of exports, government
spending and private investment and shifts in, respectively, import, tax and savings
leakages. Figures 6 and 7 confirm that growth of the export volume (E) has been the
most significant effective demand shift in the period of economic liberalization. Unlike
experiences in other Latin American countries (e.g. Mexico, Nicaragua) there was no
substantial increase in the import coefficient: the external leakage parameter remained
stable. Multipliers of government spending (G) and private investment demand (Ip)
overall have been somewhat contractionary with some fluctuations. The tax parameter
(t), strongly influenced by fluctuating oil revenues, increased early in the period (1988-
90), but fell thereafter. However, spending cuts, particularly in public investment,
which fell by almost 30% between 1988 and 1998, outweighed this expansionary effect
of a reduced tax rate.  The private investment volume (IP) expanded at a rate of 4.5%
per annum, but its overall impact on effective demand stagnated as the private savings
rate (sp) increased. By implication private consumption growth lagged behind income
growth, which in turn is a consequence of further income distributional shifts against
low-saving wage earners and in favor of higher saving profit earners and informal sec-
tor workers (see below).
These volume shifts only tell part of the macroeconomic adjustment story. Ex-
port volume growth did not commensurately lead to greater foreign exchange earnings,
as terms of trade moved unfavorably.  While the volume export share in GDP (E/Q)
rose steadily from 26% to 35%, the value share showed greater volatility with an over-
all downward trend (Fig. 8a). The import volume also showed an upward trend but be-
low export demand growth (Fig. 8b). Consequently, the reform period yielded a dou-
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bling of the trade surplus in real terms (Figure 8c). However, this real domestic savings
surplus did not translate into a comparable rise of dollar surpluses. Net foreign ex-
change earnings have been much more volatile, with the decline in oil and other com-
modity prices (partly due to the Asian crisis), moving the trade balance back into deficit
in 1997-8.
Table 2
Ecuador: Decomposition of Aggregate Demand Growth by effective demand com-
ponents
Private In-
vestment
Contribution 1
(%)
Government
Spending
Exports
Total Ag-
gregate
Demand
Growth of
aggregate
demand
(∆%)
1988 21% 30% 49% 100%
1989 23% 28% 48% 100% 0,9%
1990 20% 27% 53% 100% 1,9%
1991 24% 24% 52% 100% 6,9%
1992 22% 22% 55% 100% 3,0%
1993 21% 22% 57% 100% 2,1%
1994 21% 21% 58% 100% 4,5%
1995 22% 20% 58% 100% 3,5%
1996 20% 20% 60% 100% 0,8%
1997 22% 19% 60% 100% 4,1%
1998 23% 19% 58% 100% 2,2%
Source:  Central Bank of Ecuador, National accounts.
Note: 1. Percentage shares correspond to the shares of the three right-hand side multiplier 
components of equation 4 in aggregate demand (X).
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It should be noted that the export volume expanded despite the substantial ap-
preciation of the real exchange rate in the post-liberalization period (see Figure 5
above). Most of the volume growth comes from traditional exports, which typically
have been fairly insensitive to the real exchange rate, in particular oil and shrimps. The
second factor is related to the growth of intra-regional trade in the context of the An-
dean Pact, which was revived in 1990-91 with the harmonization of tariffs and culmi-
nated with the establishment of a common extra-regional tariff in 1995. Particularly
manufacturing trade with Colombia developed favorably, in part due to a for Ecuador
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favorable bilateral real exchange rate. The role of the Andean Pact will be discussed in
more detail below. Third, there was a modest surge of new export sectors in agriculture
(flowers, vegetables) with much of the seed money coming in the form of DFI.
What structural adjustment?: (II) Financing of the shifts in demand composition
From the above equation system one can also derive the real financial balances
as:
(5) ∆P + ∆Z + ∆A = (IP - sP.X ) + (G - t.X) + (E - m.X) = 0
where ∆P, ∆Z and ∆A stand, respectively, for the net change in financial claims against
the private sector, in government debt and in foreign assets. In the above, we looked at
the volume changes in the composition of aggregate demand components. The above
specification subsequently defines the “real” shifts in excess demand if expressed at
constant prices. As became clear in the previous section, there is an important real-
nominal twist to the adjustment process in Ecuador. Relative price shifts (domes-
tic/external, consumption/investment goods) may imply large volume shifts are needed
to achieve a small value adjustment in the finance required to accommodate the three
spending gaps defined above. Moreover, costs associated with the accumulation of net
lending over time may imply important income redistribution effects between private
and public domestic agents and the rest of the world. When taking such asset related
income transfers into account, we get the more familiar macroeconomic balances linked
to expenditures and savings out of the disposable income of each institution, rather than
from domestic product as implied by equation 5 above, i.e.:
(6) ∆Dp + ∆Dg  - (∆Fp +∆Fg ) = (IP - sP.X - i.Dg + e.i*Fp ) + (G - t.X + i.Dg + 
e.i*Fg)
 + (E - m.X – e.i*F) = 0
where Dp, Dg and F(=Fg+Fp) stand for, respectively, the stock of net private sector
debt, net government debt and net external liabilities, as accumulated through the fi-
nancing of the three gaps “after transfers” over time. We can also define NFA = -F as
the net foreign asset position to get the “after transfer” counterpart for A. The parame-
ters i, i* and e in equation 6 stand for the domestic interest rate, foreign interest rate and
the nominal exchange rate.
24
Table 3 identifies the trends in the real and nominal financial gaps “before” and
“after” the asset-related income transfers.6 The results show once more the huge vol-
ume shift in the trade balance (∆A’) needed (i) to achieve a much more modest dollar
(value) trade surplus and (ii) to meet the external debt-servicing needs. This is also re-
flected in the country’s external transfer problem. While the dollar-denominated debt-
service burden (∆NFA’-∆A’) remained high at around 6% of GDP, it fell considerably
in commodity terms to mark the problems in converting production growth into foreign
exchange earnings (Figure 9b). Private and public accumulation balances reflect the
same pattern with the more noticeable adjustment in the fiscal balance. The private
sector generated substantial savings surpluses in commodity terms (-∆Dp’), but re-
mained net borrowers in money terms (-∆Dp) for most of 1988-98.
The government’s primary surplus (-∆Z = t.X - G) increased substantially
around 1990 thanks to the rise in oil prices in the wake of the Persian Gulf war and the
spending cuts of the 1988-90 and 1992 economic adjustment programs. Various rounds
of nominal wage increases and falling oil prices after 1993 (with a temporary recovery
in 1995-6) led to a decline in the primary surplus in nominal terms, as well as a rise in
the overall nominal fiscal deficit (∆Dg). In commodity terms though, the fiscal balance
shifted to a surplus reflecting both the impact of spending cuts in volume terms and the
continued sensitivity of government finances to the oil price and exchange rate (debt
burden) (see Figure 9a).
                                                
6 In the specification of equation 6, only asset and liability-related income transfers are highlighted.
Other transfers (grants, workers remittances, etc.) are relatively small in the case of Ecuador and there-
fore are omitted to simplify notation. They are, though, included in the estimates of Table 2. The constant
price values for the accumulation balances were obtained by applying the appropriate deflators to each
aggregate demand category using national accounts implicit deflators.
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Table 3: Ecuador: Net Financial Claims1, before and after transfers
(% of GDP at current and constant prices)
Before transfers After transfers
I-spX G-tX E-mX I-spX – iDg
+e.i*Fp
G-tX+iDg
+e.i*Fg
E-mX-
e.i*F
∆P ∆Z ∆A ∆Dp ∆Dg ∆NFA
Current prices
1988 5,6% -3,5% -2,1% 1,5% 5,3% -6,8%
1989 11,9% -10,1% -1,8% 6,1% 1,2% -7,3%
1990 6,7% -12,0% 5,4% 3,8% -0,5% -3,4%
1991 9,3% -11,0% 1,7% 5,5% 0,6% -6,0%
1992 7,8% -11,6% 3,8% -0,2% 1,2% -1,0%
1993 10,3% -10,9% 0,6% 4,6% 0,1% -4,7%
1994 5,4% -8,4% 3,0% 4,7% -0,6% -4,1%
1995 5,5% -6,6% 1,1% 3,0% 1,1% -4,1%
1996 -0,2% -6,9% 7,1% -3,5% 3,0% 0,6%
1997 6,4% -7,4% 1,0% 1,2% 2,6% -3,8%
1998 9,1% -4,0% -5,1% 5,8% 6,1% -11,9%
Constant prices
∆P’ ∆Z’ ∆A’ ∆Dp’ ∆Dg’ ∆NFA’
1988 -3,8% -2,4% 6,3% -12,0% 5,7% 6,3%
1989 2,4% -7,0% 4,5% -4,5% 4,8% -0,4%
1990 1,2% -8,9% 7,7% -2,9% 4,1% -1,2%
1991 0,1% -7,5% 7,3% -5,4% 6,5% -1,1%
1992 -0,7% -9,0% 9,6% -9,5% 6,5% 3,0%
1993 -1,8% -9,1% 10,9% -7,1% 3,1% 4,0%
1994 -2,5% -9,0% 11,4% -4,4% -2,2% 6,7%
1995 -1,3% -9,9% 11,2% -7,1% -6,0% 13,1%
1996 -2,6% -10,2% 12,8% -6,9% -3,7% 10,5%
1997 -2,3% -10,1% 12,4% -7,6% -4,2% 11,8%
1998 -4,0% -7,3% 11,3% -6,5% -1,2% 7,7%
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Cuentas Nacionales, various issues and Boletín Mensual, 
various issues.
Note: 1.If ∆P, ∆Z, ∆Dp, and ∆Dg > 0, then they refer to an accumulation of domestic 
public and private debt, while if ∆NFA < 0, it refers to an increase in foreign borrow
ing.
The opening of the capital account has allowed for a different pattern of fi-
nancing of the external deficits. During the 1980s and in particular during 1987-91, Ec-
uador had little access to fresh sources of finance, despite large external deficits. In
1988-91 accumulation of arrears and refinancing of existing debt obligations were the
main items on the capital account of the balance of payments (see Table 4). Most new
disbursements came from the multilateral institutions (IDB, World Bank). The financial
opening and lifting of restrictions on direct foreign investment allowed for a modest
surge in private capital inflows. Direct foreign investment increased to around 2.5% of
GDP, up from historic levels of about 1.5%. Also commercial bank credits towards the
private sector resumed to around 3% of GDP, but this was offset for about two-thirds
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by a resumption of capital flight as recorded in the balance of payments through the
movements of short-term capital and errors and omissions. Most capital flight took
place during 1995-7 (see Table A.1), years of political turbulence with the war with
Peru, the voluntary exile of the Vice-President and the ‘Bucaramata’. Such political in-
stability, weak institutions, and the continued vulnerability of the economy to external
shocks, explain why the surge in capital flows has been much weaker than elsewhere in
the region.
Table 4
External Financing, 1988-98
1988-91 1992-98
Foreign savings 5,9% 4,1%
Portfolio investment 0,0% 0,0%
Direct investment 1,4% 2,7%
External borrowing, net 1,9% 3,1%
   by public sector 1,8% 1,4%
     - new disbursements 1,2% 0,8%
     - refinancing 0,6% 0,6%
   by private sector 0,1% 1,7%
     - new disbursements 0,3% 3,1%
     - refinancing -0,2% -1,5%
Arrears on external debt 4,0% 0,9%
Other, short-term capital 0,7% -1,9%
Change in reserves -2,2% -0,7%
        Source: Table A.1
How much of the analyzed shifts in effective demand composition can be as-
cribed to the process of economic liberalization? This is not easy to quantify. Never-
theless, to this point we can infer from the analysis of the trends that:
• The external balance (nominal) remains strongly sensitive to shocks in the external
terms of trade (particularly oil prices).
• There has been a strong growth in the export volume since 1992, while import de-
mand has remained fairly stable. The export volume growth is partly due to in-
creased oil production enabled in part by the opening to direct foreign investment in
the sector, but oil export levels remain subject to macroeconomic policy considera-
tions. As shown below, there has been some growth of non-traditional exports,
which can be ascribed to the freeing of trade and capital. However, the growth of
new export sectors has not been enough to reduce the economy’s dependence on
traditional primary exports.
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• Unlike elsewhere in the region, trade liberalization has not produced an upward
shift in the import demand curve.
• Fiscal adjustment equally is still heavily influenced by external factors, i.e. oil
prices on the revenue side and the external debt overhang on the expenditure side.
Tariff reduction has not produced a substantial loss of government revenue.
• Capital account liberalization has allowed for a modest increase in capital inflows
which helped to support the relative stabilization of the value of the sucre (at least
during 1992-6), consequently producing a real exchange rate appreciation.
In the next section the sectoral shifts underlying the macroeconomic adjustment
pattern are analyzed to obtain a better view of the structural change produced by the
liberalization process.
Figures 9a and 9b
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Sectoral performance and productivity change
The export drive following the economic liberalization is not reflected in major
shifts in the sectoral composition of output. Non-oil traded goods sectors (agriculture,
manufacturing) expanded at a similar pace as the non-traded goods sector (see Figure
10). Much of the export growth concentrated in the traditional agricultural sector (ba-
nanas and shrimp). Non-traditional exports increased five-fold, however from small
initial levels. Traditional exports are all primary commodities (oil, bananas, shrimp,
coffee, cocoa) and still make up about 80% of the total value of export earnings. The
share of non-traditional exports did increase from 7 to 20% between 1990 and 1997.7
Some of this increase is in new, labour-intensive agricultural products (flowers, vegeta-
bles), but an important share of the non-traditional export increase is in manufactured
goods shipped to neighboring countries of the Andean Pact. The principal products in-
clude processed seafood, luxury consumption goods and vehicles, all characterized by
capital-intensive production methods (see Vos 1987 and Creamer et al. 1997).
Figure 10
ECUADOR: TRADED, NON-TRADED AND OIL SECTOR GROWTH 
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7 In 1998 non-traditional exports even reached a quarter of total export earnings, but this outcome is
heavily influenced by the decline in oil prices and the impact of El Niño on banana, coffee and cocoa
production. Shrimp cultivation benefited from El Niño warmer water and a rise in productivity of about
25% (see Vos, et. al 1998).
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Table 5 shows the growth of exports from Ecuador to the other members of the
Andean Community. The lowering of the tariffs and reduction of the dispersion in tariff
rates by commodity type did reduce dispersion of effective protection rates across
manufactured sectors, but non-basic consumption and capital goods sectors still benefit
from greater protection.8 Export growth has been substantially larger in the more pro-
tected sectors. This bias in output expansion in the high productivity, capital-intensive
manufacturing sectors seems to have been part of a larger picture.
A decomposition analysis of productivity growth and sectoral employment re-
allocation confirms the pattern of adjustment following liberalization as sketched in the
introduction (Figures 1a and 1b). In this story, liberalization may lead to (relatively)
less demand for formal employment at a given level of output through pressures toward
cost reduction via enhanced labour productivity in tradable goods sectors along with
growth of demand for relatively low-skilled jobs in non-traded sectors. The reduction in
formal employment then is likely associated with an increase in informal jobs and
greater self-employment in sectors such as commerce and services. As we shall se be-
low this explanation could apply to the early liberalization period (1990-95) – as de-
picted by Figure 1a –, but more expansionary macroeconomic policies led to a partial
reversal thereafter (Figure 1b).
Measurement of productivity growth is hampered by a lack of consistent em-
ployment data. To analyze what happened during the 1990s only two sources provide
nation-wide employment data, i.e. the 1990 population census and the 1995 living stan-
dards measurement survey. However, employment definitions are not strictly compara-
ble, where the census data likely heavily underestimate participation and occupation
rates of female labour. Using these sources would lead to implausibly high employment
growth. The urban employment survey provides a more consistent source with data for
1988-1997. Hence we recur to this source with two drawbacks: it only covers the urban
workforce and it requires using a proxy for “urban” production which we equate with
the non-agricultural sector. The latter assumption probably leads to an overestimation
of productivity levels in some sectors, which are also important as sources of rural em-
                                                
8 “Non-basic” consumer goods production, referred to in Table 4, are defined as commodities with in-
come elasticities of demand of larger than one, while basic goods are those with elasticities smaller than
one. EPR estimates are from Creamer (1998), but following the methodology and sector classification as
in Vos (1987).
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ployment (in particular, construction, commerce, and services). The trend over time,
however, likely is not affected by this assumption.
Bearing these limitations in mind, non-agricultural productivity growth since
1992 has been dismal, averaging 0.1% per year.9 As shown in Table 6, output growth in
the traded goods sector outpaced employment growth leading to an annual 2.4% pro-
ductivity increase. At the same time there was a productivity decline in the non-traded
goods sector. Productivity fell in construction, transport and other services. The trans-
port sector (also closely linked to informal trade and services) and, especially, other
services absorbed a more than average employment growth, confirming the above hy-
pothesis that the productivity growth in the traded goods sector may have pushed much
of the labour force growth into informal employment.
Table 5:  Ecuador: Total exports and exports to Andean community, 1990-1997
EPR 1
1991
1990 1995 1997 Annual
growth
1990-97
Total exports to Andean Pact (US$ mln) 189 359 483 14,4%
of which (US$ mln fob):
  Basic consumption goods 22,0% 62 92 97 6,6%
  Intermediate products 30,2% 60 40 51 -2,2%
  Luxury consumption goods 36,7% 24 96 214 36,9%
  Capital goods 39,0% 43 130 121 15,9%
Memo items:
Total non-traditional exports (world) 186 855 1142 29,6%
  of which: Manufactures 147 581 764 26,5%
Share of Andean pact exports in total (%) 6,9% 8,1% 9,2%
Source:  Banco Central del Ecuador, Boletín Mensual, various issues; Creamer (1998).
Note: 1. EPR is the effective protection rate. See Creamer et. al. (1997) for the estimation procedure. 
The EPR estimates consider the new tariff structure established by countries of the Andean Pact 
in 1990.
                                                
9 There is no major reason to assume that there have been strong productivity increases in agriculture as
a whole either. Some export sectors (bananas, shrimp, flowers) likely showed productivity growth, but in
other sectors (cocoa, livestock, domestic food crops) there has been little to no innovation. In fact, a
“simulated” estimate of productivity growth for the economy as a whole using adjusted employment data
for the 1990 census indicate overall productivity growth was 0.2% per year between 1990 and 1995, with
agricultural productivity growing at 1.3%. For this exercise the employment data of the 1990 census
were adjusted for the alleged underreporting of female participation rates and inclusion of unpaid family
workers in the work force to make the data more comparable to the 1995 LSMS survey. These results are
shown in Appendix table A.3  but because of the assumptions made may be subject to a margin of error.
The main conclusions drawn in the text are consistent with these findings though.
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Productivity growth in the traded goods sector is strongly influenced by the
trend in the oil sector. As mentioned before, production in the oil sector has been influ-
enced by two factors in the 1990s. Firstly, the policy, which targets oil revenues leading
to, hastened depletion of the natural resource. Secondly, the lifting of controls on for-
eign investment in the oil sector has led to further productivity increases. The high
volatility in the productivity levels suggests the former factor still predominates. Pro-
ductivity in manufacturing increased at a rate of 1.3% between 1992-97 after strongly
declining trends (due to the recession and falling capacity utilization) in the 1980s. This
finding appears to be consistent with the increase in manufactured exports and the shift
towards more capital-intensive sectors such as non-basic consumption goods and capi-
tal goods.
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Table 6: Decomposition of Non-Agricultural Productivity Growth
Non-agricultural productivity growth 1992-97
Employment
share
1997
Output-labour
ratio (sucres of
1975 x 10^3)
1997
Output
growth
Employment
growth
Productivity
growth
Contribution to
productivity
growth
Weights of
productivity
change
Employment
reallocation
Li/L Xi/Li dXi/Xi dLi/Li ρi* Σρi* (Xi/X).ρi* (Xi/X -Li/L).Li*
Agriculture1 2,6% 3,4%
Oil and mining 0,4% 2.795 5,3% -3,0% 8,5% 1,0% 1,5% -0,5%
Manufacturing 16,9% 68 3,2% 1,8% 1,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,1%
Electricity, gas and water 0,3% 295 1,3% -10,3% 13,0% 0,1% 0,2% -0,1%
Construction 6,8% 27 0,9% 1,2% -0,3% -0,1% 0,0% 0,0%
Commerce 30,4% 37 3,0% 1,6% 1,4% 0,1% 0,3% -0,2%
Transport and communications 6,1% 112 3,7% 3,8% -0,1% 0,2% 0,0% 0,2%
Financial services 4,9% 114 1,8% 1,1% 0,8% 0,1% 0,1% 0,0%
Other services 34,1% 28 0,5% 5,1% -4,4% -1,6% -0,7% -0,9%
Total non-agricultural output 100,0% 58 2,9% 2,8% 0,1% 0,1% 1,6% -1,5%
Traded goods 17,3% 128 4,2% 1,7% 2,4% 1,3% 1,8% -0,5%
  Non-oil, traded goods 16,9% 68 3,2% 1,8% 1,3% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3%
Non-traded goods 82,7% 44 2,1% 3,0% -0,9% -1,2% -0,2% -1,0%
Source:  Banco Central del Ecuador, Cuentas Nacionales; INEC, Encuestas de Empleo Urbano.
Note: See text for estimation methodology and appendix tables for detailed estimates.
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A decomposition analysis of the aggregate productivity growth10 clearly shows
that productivity increased in sectors with relatively high output/labour ratios (oil and
manufactures), while it fell in sectors with low labour-intensity (especially other serv-
ices). (See Table 6).
The shifts have been far from dramatic though. Productivity gains have been
small and the largest productivity differentials have been where they have been where
they have been ever since the 1970s: oil and manufacturing versus urban informal
services (see Vos 1987, Jácome, Larrea & Vos 1998). Also during the 1970s and 1980s
the incentive structure was biased towards the more capital-intensive, non-basic indus-
trial sector. In the 1990s, the institutional setting has changed from a heavily protected
inward-looking industry sector to a more export-oriented one, but the output dynamics
remains concentrated where there is lesser employment creation, pushing excess labour
into the urban informal services sector. From this perspective, the more recent sectoral
reallocations seem like very little structural adjustment indeed.
Tables 7 and 8 further confirm the hypothesized restructurings in the labour
market: a rising share in urban informal employment and an increasing skill-intensity in
the production of tradables after the trade reform. The implications for the distribution
of factor incomes, inequality of household incomes and poverty are discussed in the
next section.
                                                
10 Following Taylor et al. (1998), one can also decompose growth of overall labour productivity as fol-
lows. Labour productivity is defined as: ρ = X/L = ∑Xi/∑Li , where X is output and L is labour. The first
difference version is:
ρ* = ∑[(Xi/X)Xi* - (Li/L)Li*]
r     = ∑(Li/L)ρi* + ∑[(Xi/X) - (Li/L)]Xi*                     
     = ∑(Xi/X)ρi* + ∑[(Xi/X) - (Li/L)]Li*
with the asterisks indicating growth rates. The first line decomposes overall productivity growth into
movements in output and employment, weighted by sectoral shares of these two variables. The second
and third lines show how overall productivity change can be written as a weighted average of sectoral
productivity shifts plus a "correction" term involving weighted reallocations of output or employment
across sectors. The reallocation weights [(Xi/X) - (Li/L)] reflect differing productivity levels in different
sectors. An output or employment loss in a low productivity sector (agriculture, for example, with a
negative value of (Xi/X) - (Li/L)), will add to overall productivity growth, as will an employment or out-
put gain in a sector with a relatively high output/labour ratio.
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Table 7 Ecuador: Urban Informal Employment (share of EAP)
1990 1992 1995
Total 54.5% 58.1% 56.3%
Micro-enterprises 27.4% 32.5% 31.6%
Domestic Employment 4.5% 4.3% 4.8%
Non-skilled Independent Workers and
Relatives without Payment
34.5% 34.3% 32.6%
         Source: INEC, Encuestas de Empleo Urbano
Table 8
 Ecuador: Skilled-Unskilled labour demand by sector1, 1990-5
Ratio Skilled/unskilled
1990 1995
Agriculture 0,12 0,30
Oil and mining 0,78 1,48
Manufacturing 0,94 1,65
Electricity, gas and water 2,42 0,46
Construction 0,40 1,19
Commerce 1,11 2,27
Transport and communications 1,32 3,58
Financial services 10,50 10,82
Other services 1,93 0,77
Total 0,76 0,83
Traded goods 0,28 0,40
  Non-oil, traded goods 0,28 0,33
Non-traded goods 1,42 1,34
Source: INEC, Censo de Población 1990; Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida 1995
Note:    1. “Unskilled” defined as workers with less than 9 achieved grades of formal 
education (primary plus two years of secondary education); “skilled” workers 
with 9 or more years (grades) of formal education.
Before turning to that discussion it should be pointed out that after a closer look
at the data (Table 7), it appears that most of the shift to informal employment, in fact
took place in the early phase of trade liberalization (1990-92), while thereafter formal
sector (wage) employment regains some territory (see also Table A.4). Using the dia-
grams sketched in section 1, it can be hypothesized that this likely has been the out-
come of a combination of (slight) productivity gains in the (formal) traded goods sector
and macroeconomic stop-go policies. The liberalization process has yielded some pro-
ductivity gains provoking a relative drop in the formal traded goods sector. The macro-
economic stabilization efforts in the early 1990s reinforced this by fiscal adjustment
and demand deflation and more workers are pushed into informal activity. After 1995
the macro story prevails as political and external factors (see section 2) provoke a more
expansionary fiscal stance. Aggregate demand expansion allows for expansion of for-
mal employment.
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4. WAGES, DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY
Real wage trends and labour market adjustment
The employment shift away from modern sector wage labour into informal
sector and self-employed employment is a trend already found during the crisis of the
1980s. The share of wage earners in the urban labour force declined from 65.7% in
1982 to 55.1% in 1990 and further to 53.6% in 1995 (Table 9). In rural areas a similar
trend is found. The trend is related to falling employment opportunities in particular in
manufacturing, construction and government services; sectors with high shares of wage
labour. However, it is likely as much associated with falling real wages which have
witnessed a declining trend since 1980. By 1992 the real minimum wage had fallen to a
third of the 1980 level (Figure 11). As the minimum wage is indicative for the institu-
tional setting of most wages and salaries, this severe drop in the return to wage labour
likely provided an incentive to find an income in other types of jobs. Various rounds of
nominal wage increases decreed by the Sixto Duran government starting in 1992 sup-
ported a recovery of the real wage, however without being able to restore it to the level
reached in the early 1980s.
Declines in the share of wage employment and in real wages are reflected in a
steep fall in the share of the overall wage bill in total value added (see Figure 12). The
wage share fell from around 33% of factor income to around 15% between 1980 and
1995. In contrast the share of self-employment income increased from 44 to around
70% in the same period.11 The corporate profit share also fell in favor of self-employed
income. Since 1992, both the wage and corporate profit shares have regained some
ground. The available series are too short to conclude whether this is the beginning of a
structural trend associated with the liberalization process or not.12
Table 9  Ecuador: Share of wage earners in labour force, 1982-95
1982 1990 1995
Urban wage earners (% of urban EAP) 65.7 55.1 53.6
Rural wage earners (% of rural EAP) 38.5 33.7 32.2
      Source: INEC, Population Censuses, 1982, 1990 and INEC, Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida, 1995
                                                
11 The data are derived from the Central Bank’s national accounts, where the estimate of the share of
self-employed income is obtained from the gross operating surplus of households and unincorporated
businesses as reported in the household accounts. The usual caveats hold with regard to the residual na-
ture of components of the income and outlays of households in the national accounts.
12 Available national accounts data with detailed institutional accounts only run to 1995.
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The decline of wage shares has been substantial across all sectors (except finan-
cial services where it increased) during the adjustment period of 1983-1992 (Table 10).
The recovery of wage shares has been more differentiated. Much of the real wage in-
crease accrued to public sector workers and is reflected in a rising wage share in the
other services sector after 1992. Traded goods sectors show only a slight recovery in
the very low wage shares, from 7.3 to 9.2% between 1992 and 1995. In agriculture the
wage share increased from 8.4 to 11.3% of factor income in the same period, while in
manufacturing it increased from 6.4 to 7.5%. For sure no revolutionary changes. In ef-
fect in manufacturing two partially offsetting tendencies were at work here: first, as
analyzed above, the sectoral effects of liberalization pushed towards less labour-
intensive activities putting a downward effect on the wage share. Second, the real wage
hike pushed in the opposite direction and appears to have outweighed the former effect.
In contrast in agriculture there was a (modest) shift towards more labour-intensive ac-
tivities (flowers, vegetables, etc. for export production) which combined with the wage
increase to a somewhat higher wage share.
On the whole, real wages in urban traded goods sectors declined by some 20%
relative to those in the non-traded goods sector between 1988 and 1997 (see Figure 13).
The finding is consistent with two earlier findings: the appreciation of the real ex-
change rate and the low wage share in the traded goods sector. The modest increase in
the wage share in the non-traded sectors after 1992 is principally due to wage increases
in the public administration. As can be inferred from Table 10, the wage share in the
non-traded market sector continued to fall after the 1992 reforms and which seems con-
sistent with the hypothesis that liberalization brought a continued growth of informal
sector employment.
Average wages disguise trends towards a greater wage inequality. The shift to-
wards a greater skill-intensity in traded goods sectors (see Table 8) is reflected in a ris-
ing dispersion in wage incomes in that sector. Recent data are only available for urban
workers. Measuring wage inequality among private sector workers by the coefficient of
variation (CV), shows a stronger widening in inequality in the traded goods sector until
1994, but afterwards the within-sector wage inequality fell, likely because of the
equalizing effect of the minimum wage adjustment  (Figure 13).
The wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers shows a more con-
tinuous inequalizing trend, however (Figure 14). This wage differential increased from
58% in 1988 to well over 100% in 1997. A more detailed analysis of these income gaps
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shows that the within-group inequality fell for both skilled and unskilled workers (León
and Vos 1999), such that the between-group, skilled-unskilled wage gap is the persis-
tent determinant of wage inequality despite the minimum wage increases between 1994
and 1997. This points at a deepening of the existing segmentation of (urban) labour
markets in Ecuador along human capital lines. Real wages fell significantly for both
skilled and unskilled workers during the emerging economic crisis in 1998. As Figure
14 also shows, this did not lead to a reduction of the wage gap as both types of workers
seem equally hit by the renewed acceleration of inflation and lagging nominal wage
adjustments.
Table  10
Ecuador: Trends in Wage Shares1 by Type of Industry, 1980-95
1980 1988 1992 1995
Traded2 20,4% 10,4% 7,3% 9,2%
  Traded, non-oil 26,1% 9,9% 7,1% 8,9%
Non-Traded 42,8% 27,0% 19,5% 21,4%
  Non-traded, private3 31,8% 16,2% 12,1% 11,4%
Total 33,7% 19,9% 14,0% 16,5%
          Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, Cuentas Nacionales.
          Notes: 1.  Wage shares are taken as a percentage of value added at factor prices.
2.  Includes agriculture, oil and mining, and manufacturing.
3.  Non-traded goods sectors excluding government services.
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Figure 11
 Ecuador: Real Minimum Wage, 1970-98 (sucres per month of 1990)
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Figure 13
 Wage inequality in urban traded and non-traded sectors
(private sector workers only)
Source: INEC, Encuestas de Empleo Urbano.
Note:    CV = coefficient of variation of monthly wage per worker.
Figure 14
  Ecuador: Trends in wages of skilled and unskilled urban wage earners
and urban unemployment, 1988-95
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Figure 15
Urban formal-informal sector income gap1, 1988-97
Source: INEC, Encuestas de Empleo Urbano
Note: 1. Refers to differential between mean private worker, modern sector wage
and mean income of informal sector self-employed.
Similarly, the gap between formal and informal urban workers has maintained a
rising tendency (Figure 15). This formal-informal income gap tends to move inversely
with the open urban unemployment rate, which hints both at the residual character of
the informal labour market segment and at the fact that the level of unemployment is a
factor of influence in formal sector wage setting.
Returns to education and urban labour market segmentation
Results of an application of Mincerian earnings functions13 for urban workers
confirm that returns to education for wage earners increased after 1992, but also show
that the beneficial effect has been for male labourers only (Table 11). Returns for fe-
male wage earners and for self-employed did not increase. The results also show that
educational returns are higher for female workers than for male wage earners. This, to-
gether, with substantially lower female participation rates suggests the urban labour
                                                
13 The estimated functions reported here are quite standard: ln (W/hr) = f (S, E, E2,  xi), where the de-
pendent variable is the log of earnings per hour, S is years of completed schooling, E is work experience,
E2 is squared work experience and xi is a vector of appropriate dummy variables, including location
(Quito),  sector (government in case of wage earners), etc.
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market poses barriers to entry to female workers. Returns to education are lower and
declining for self-employed, as expected, and the standard Mincerian function has
much less explanatory power for this group of workers. This confirms the earlier con-
clusion of a continued and deepening labour market segmentation along the divides of
human capital endowment and firm type.
Table 11  Ecuador: Returns to education1 for urban wage earners and self-
employed workers, 1988-97
1988 1990 1992 1995 1997
Wage earners
   Males
   Females
7.8
11.3
7.9
11.0
8.7
11.2
8.4
11.2
8.4
11.0
Self-employed
   Males
   Females
7.4
8.6
6.5
7.3
8.0
7.3
7.9
6.2
6.9
7.4
Source:  León and Vos (1999) based on data from INEC, Encuestas de Empleo Urbano, 1988-97.
Note: 1.  Returns to education refer to percentage increase in expected (hourly) income due to one 
additional year of schooling. Estimates obtained through Mincerian earnings functions. See 
León and Vos (1999) for details.
Labour market flexibilization, employment and distribution
Ecuador’s cumbersome labour legislation could be expected to provide major
distortions and cost-raising effects to the hiring of labour in the modern sector. At the
same time, low and declining wage shares throughout the economy make it difficult to
believe that labour market reform will have a major effect on overall economic per-
formance. Moreover, as discussed in section 2, compliance to labour laws is low, even
in the modern sector. In consequence, the labour cost-raising effect of the existing la-
bour legislation is believed to be small and employers seem little worried about the ex-
isting labour regulation (see Cox-Edwards 1996). In a more stylized analysis, Rama
(1996) does find some positive growth and employment effects following labour mar-
ket reform, as it would shift workers from the informal sector to modern wage em-
ployment. Rama’s model assumes full compliance with existing legislation such that it
may overstate the likely impact of a labour market reform. Nevertheless also according
to Rama (1996: 324), one should not expect labour reform to be a panacea and that a
larger poverty-reducing impact should be expected from long-term investment in edu-
cation.
This is not to say that labour market reform would not be relevant and urgent. In
particular, the existing payment system and institutional wage setting make the remu-
neration system complex and little transparent. Minimum wage legislation with its
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mandatory benefits guides the payment pyramid in both public and private sectors. The
historical pattern has shown this makes modern sector nominal wage adjustments rigid
and subject to political decision-making. The upshot being that with inflation up, work-
ers tend to loose purchasing power over time. The above has suggested that real wage
trends are closely associated with urban poverty. Hence a more transparent system of
remunerations could help keep better defend purchasing power of workers on the one
hand, as well as ease estimation of the production cost and budgetary implications of
wage adjustments to private investors and the public administration.
Urban income distribution and poverty
The above tendencies are further reflected in a growing inequality in urban in-
comes. Real incomes of the richest quintile (Q.V) recovered earlier and faster from the
high-inflation episode at the end of the 1980s. Between 1994 and 1996 real income in-
creases are stronger for the lowest quintiles (Q.I-III). The survey data also show a sub-
stantial recovery of real incomes of the urban poorest (Q.I). Per capita household in-
comes of the lower-middle income groups (Q.II-III) are closest related to the trends in
the real (minimum) wage, as Figure 16 shows.  This link is weaker for the poorest ur-
ban household as a larger proportion of this income group is engaged as self-employed
in urban informal activities.
The upshot of the above trends is that one can observe both a rise in urban ine-
quality and a fall in the poverty incidence after 1992 (up to 1997). This is shown in
Figure 17. The Gini for per capita urban household income increased from 0.44 to 0.48
between 1988 and 1992 and increased further to 0.50 in 1995. After 1995 there has
been a slight drop, possibly due to loss in momentum of the liberalization process in the
political turmoil of 1995-6 and the subsequent decline in growth of traded goods pro-
duction. Urban poverty declined substantially after 1992 and shows a close inverse cor-
relation with the trend in real wages (Figure 17). Falling real wages and employment
along with rising inequality in per capita incomes in the emerging economic crisis of
1998 appear to have undone all of the poverty reduction achieved during 1992-7.
In the light of the above discussion (falling wage shares, rising informal, self-
employed employment), this strong correlation between real wage trends and poverty
maybe somewhat counterintuitive. There may be a number of possible explanations to
this finding. First, the survey data used here (INEC’s Encuesta de Empleo Urbano) are
subject to important limitations. These will not be detailed here, but see León and Vos
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(1999) for an extensive discussion. Two important limitations are mentioned here: (a)
incomes are likely strongly underreported, particularly those referring to non-wage in-
comes; and (b) while questionnaires and sample design have been by and large unal-
tered, survey enumerators were better instructed starting with the 1995 survey which
led to, in particular, a more concise registration of labour incomes. As a consequence
one should assume that poverty indices are overestimated, while inequality measures
maybe understated. Nevertheless, after performing a sensitivity analysis for various
types of adjustments for alleged underreporting and observed non-reporting, Leon and
Vos (1999) still find the same trends as reported in Figures 17. After adjustment, the
rise in real per capita incomes and the fall in the poverty incidence from 1995 onwards
become much less pronounced, but the observed trend remains unaltered. On these
grounds the results in Figures 16 and 17 seem defendable proxies of the direction of
change.
Figure 16: Real urban per capita incomes by quintiles and the minimum wage,
1988-97
(index, 1988=100)
Source:  León and Vos (1999), based on INEC, Encuestas de Empleo Urbano.
Note: Min.wage refers to real effective minimum wage (including bonuses and additional monthly 
payments); Q.I = first quintile (poorest 20%), Q.II-IV = second, third and fourth quintile (20-
60%) and Q.V = fifth quintile (richest 20%).
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Figure 17: Ecuador: Urban poverty, inequality and the minimum wage, 1988-97
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all variables is November of each year.
Second, what economic explanation could be given? A number of reasons re-
quiring further investigation can be given:
• Labour participation rates have increased during the 1980s and 1990s. Some work-
ers may have abandoned wage employment and shifted to informal sector activities,
but in other cases self-employed activities may have been taken up next to existing
wage employment or by engaging other family members into the income earning
process even if only part-time. If the latter aspect is of some weight, wage incomes
may remain a key income source to families even if the share of wage employment
is falling. In effect, the shares of wage income and self-employed incomes in total
household income remained virtually stable between 1988 and 1997 (León and Vos
1999).14
• Demand effects of real wage increases have important feedback effects on incomes
in informal activities. This assumes demand for informal services and output of
manufactured micro-enterprises mainly depends on consumption demand from
                                                
14 For the low-income groups (first quintile of per capita income distribution) the share of self-employed
income in total household income remained stable at 41% between 1988 and 1997, as did the wage share
at 47%. The composition of the wage share changed though, with a falling share for public sector wages
and a rising share for private sector wages. Trends for other quintiles are quite similar. For all house-
holds, the average share of self-employed income increased from 33 to 35% between 1988 and 1997, that
of public sector wages dropped from 23 to 17% and that of private sector wages increased from 34 to
38%. See León and Vos (1999) for further details.
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wage-earning households and that of the self-employed themselves. Several studies
have found this to be the case during the 1970s, using input-output and general
equilibrium modelling frameworks (Vos 1987, Kouwenaar 1988 and Creamer
1992). More recent work (De Janvry, Sadoulet and Fargeix 1991 and Rama 1996)
also confirm the hypothesis, but most of the key parameter values were borrowed
from the earlier modelling work. Thus, while it seems convenient to assume that
demand impulses derived from higher real wages work their way through into
higher self-employed incomes and hence have a multiplier effect in reducing pov-
erty, the proposition still requires proper testing for the economic structure that is
emerging after the 1992 economic reform process.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has tried to trace the employment and income distribution effects of
the liberalization of the current and capital account of the balance of payments of Ecua-
dor during the 1990s. The insistence of multilateral organizations, particularly the IMF
and the World Bank, that developing countries should entail trade and capital account
liberalization is based on the notion that economic opening will bring important welfare
gains. Countries often resist as they fear important adjustment costs, such as a rise in
unemployment in the short run. Textbook approaches to structural adjustment and lib-
eralization of the external sector typically side-step the question of unemployment and
income distribution effects. In the orthodox approach which takes the simple Heck-
scher-Ohlin model as a benchmark, these issues are non-existent. According to the sim-
plest textbook approach, in a small developing economy with capital-intensive imports,
mobile factors and flexible prices, a reduction of import tariffs will no have no effect on
total employment, not even in the short-run. Trade liberalization would lead to a secto-
ral reallocation of resources though and – by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem – redis-
tribute income in favor of the input-intensive factor of production of exports, i.e. sup-
posedly unskilled labour in the case of developing countries. In Latin America’s reality,
of course, adjustment and liberalization have been accompanied in many cases by ris-
ing unemployment, while rising inequality both skilled and unskilled workers and be-
tween wage and non-wage earners has been found in countries with either labour- or
capital-intensive exportables (Berry 1997, Ganuza, Taylor and Morley 1998). The na-
ture of the labour market, with typically wage rigidity in modern sectors and a good
deal of labour market segmentation, is crucial in understanding the outcomes of the lib-
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eralization process on incomes and employment. Macroeconomic policies and vulner-
ability to external shocks will compound such outcomes.
Ecuador’s liberalization process started in earnest only in the early 1990s. It has
made the economy even more dependent on export growth. Some growth of non-
traditional exports has taken place, but oil and other traditional primary exports remain
the key source of foreign exchange earnings, as well as of the vulnerability to external
shocks. Overall we have a case of capital- or natural resource-intensive exportables (oil,
bananas), labour-intensive non-tradables and importables (domestic food and liberal-
ized manufactures) as the second most labour-intensive sector. Trade models with wage
rigidity predict that liberalization under such initial structural conditions will reduce
employment (Cox-Edwards and Edwards 1994). In Ecuador we saw no steep increase
in unemployment rates, but – with high poverty and no unemployment benefit schemes
– a strong rise in urban informal employment in the initial years of the liberalization,
following a pattern sketched with a broad brush in Figure 1a. Capital account liberali-
zation, real exchange rate appreciation, a return to expansionary fiscal policies and
minimum wage increases reverted some of this trend in the mid 1990s, following the
pattern of Figure 1b. Political conditions and external vulnerability make the situation
quite volatile. Macro policies have been characterized by a “stop-go” pattern ever since
the early 1980s and this has not changed in the post-liberalization era. Continued reli-
ance on oil exports characterized the main source of external volatility. During the
1990s negative terms of trade shocks more than offset large volume increases in tradi-
tional and non-traditional exports, while also large volume adjustments proved insuffi-
cient to protect the fiscal balance against declining oil revenues.
Urban wage earners suffered heavy income losses during the ill-conceived sta-
bilization efforts of the 1980s, but could regain some ground during the post-
liberalization period when inflation dropped and real wages increased. Contrary to
popular perceptions in Ecuador, urban poverty appears to have declined between 1992
and 1997. From the above, the major underlying cause should be found in macroeco-
nomic policies, rather than in the effects of liberalization per se. As indicated, the
structural conditions predict a loss of employment and real wage declines following the
liberalization (in the short-run at least). Macroeconomic policies helped to revert the
trend in mean real wages and thereby helped reduce urban poverty. This happy out-
come has proven to be unsustainable. First, the macroeconomic policies did not help to
decrease labour market segmentation, nor the trends towards rising wage inequality
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between skilled and unskilled workers and a rising wedge between formal and informal
workers. Second, sustained external vulnerability and slippage in fiscal discipline
pushed the twin deficits to unprecedented heights by the end of 1998. This triggered a
currency crisis, a full-blown banking crisis and high inflation in 1999. The subsequent
drop in employment and real incomes undid most (and possibly more than that) of real
income gains of the urban poor in the preceding years. Third, vulnerability to external
shocks has remained. However, the crisis of 1998-9, is not simply due to falling oil
prices and El Niño. Sequencing of reform policies equally has been problematic. In
particular, the banking sector was liberalized at a point where it was virtually bankrupt
and could only live on continued borrowing from the Central Bank (Figure 4 and Izu-
rieta 1999) for as long as the foreign reserve position could keep up. Real exchange rate
appreciation and high real interest rates did not particularly help stimulate industrial
restructuring towards more labour-intensive export activities.
While the functioning of the Ecuadorian economy underwent some fundamental
changes as a consequence of the liberalization process, the old story of (primary) ex-
port-driven growth cycles has not lost its relevance.  Given the other structural features,
this is bad news for the long-term prospects of the welfare of the poor population. More
investment in human capital is but one element that clearly can turn the story into a
happier one. However, the fruits of that will only become visible in the medium run.
Labour market reform and promotion of labour-intensive export production will help
lay additional foundations for a growth pattern that may achieve more effective em-
ployment growth and poverty reduction. However, in the short run there is still the for-
midable task of achieving a sustainable macroeconomic stability and coping with the
enormous costs of restructuring the bankrupt financial sector.  A surge in oil prices
would be a welcome event to provide a cushion. However, if this positive external
shock would just mean a fall back to the type of complacency with reform policies over
the past decades, such a rescue in the short run would mean just another delay of the
type of structural change needed to achieve the indicated long-run development goals.
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Table A.1: Macroeconomic indicators, Ecuador 1988-98
units 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Trade liberalization
Nominal import tariffs weighted average 39.1% 24.6% 15.5% 9.3% 8.5% 11.9% 11.3% 11.3% 13.9%
      Minimum tariff 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
maximum tariff 290.0% 80.0% 50.0% 37.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 35.0% 38.0%
       Primary products weighted average 7.6% 10.3% 10.4% 9.9% 9.9%
       Manufactured products weighted average 39.0% 25.1% 15.8% 9.5% 8.8% 12.1% 11.4% 11.4% 12.5%
Exports (% GDP) current prices 28.4% 29.4% 32.7% 31.4% 31.5% 26.2% 26.7% 29.7% 30.5% 30.0% 26.2%
Imports (% GDP) current prices 30.5% 31.2% 27.4% 29.7% 27.7% 25.5% 23.7% 28.6% 23.4% 29.0% 31.2%
Trade balance (% GDP) current prices -2.1% -1.8% 5.4% 1.7% 3.8% 0.6% 3.0% 1.1% 7.1% 1.0% -5.1%
Exports (% GDP) constant prices 26.7% 26.1% 28.2% 29.3% 31.5% 32.2% 33.3% 34.4% 34.7% 35.4% 34.8%
Imports (% GDP) constant prices 20.5% 21.6% 20.4% 22.0% 21.8% 21.3% 21.9% 23.3% 21.9% 23.0% 23.5%
Trade balance (% GDP) constant prices 6.3% 4.5% 7.7% 7.3% 9.6% 10.9% 11.4% 11.2% 12.8% 12.4% 11.3%
Capital account liberalization
Foreign savings (% GDP) 6.8% 7.3% 3.4% 6.0% 1.0% 4.7% 4.1% 4.1% -0.6% 3.8% 11.9%
Portfolio investment (% GDP) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Direct foreign investment (% GDP) 1.5% 1.6% 1.2% 1.4% 1.4% 3.3% 3.2% 2.6% 2.5% 2.9% 3.3%
External borrowing, net (% GDP) 1.3% 5.2% 0.6% 0.6% -1.0% 2.1% 2.8% 8.7% 5.1% 4.3% -0.8%
     By public sector 1.3% 4.7% 0.5% 0.6% -1.8% -0.3% 1.5% 4.6% 3.0% 1.5% 1.3%
         New disbursements -0.4% 4.5% 0.0% 0.9% -2.2% -0.2% 0.5% 2.4% 2.6% 1.8% 1.1%
         Refinancing and capitalization of interest arrears 1.7% 0.3% 0.5% -0.3% 0.5% -0.1% 1.0% 2.3% 0.4% -0.3% 0.2%
   By private sector 0.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.8% 2.4% 1.4% 4.1% 2.1% 2.8% -2.1%
         New disbursements 0.4% 0.6% 0.1% 0.0% 0.8% 2.4% 2.3% 8.1% 4.8% 4.0% -0.5%
         Refinancing and capitalization of interest arrears -0.4% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.9% -4.0% -2.7% -1.1% -1.5%
Payment arrears on external debt (% GDP) 3.3% 4.2% 4.1% 4.3% 2.4% 3.3% 0.7% -0.6% 0.3% -0.1% 0.3%
Other short-term capital inflows (% GDP) 0.4% 0.1% 1.2% 1.1% -1.7% -0.6% 0.1% -7.5% -7.1% -2.1% 5.6%
Change in reserves (% GDP) 0.2% -3.9% -3.7% -1.3% -0.2% -3.3% -2.8% 0.9% -1.4% -1.3% 3.4%
Public and private external debt
Total external debt (% GDP) 107% 117% 114% 109% 101% 95% 88% 78% 77% 76% 76%
   Public external debt 105% 116% 113% 107% 99% 91% 83% 69% 66% 64% 65%
   Private external debt 1% 2% 2% 1% 2% 4% 5% 9% 10% 13% 10%
Total domestic debt (% GDP)
   Public domestic debt
   Private domestic debt
Exchange rate and terms of trade
Nominal exchange rate (sucres per US$) market rate, annual avg. 302 526 768 1,046 1,534 1,919 2,197 2,564 3,189 3,998 5,338
Real effective exchange rate (index, August 1992=100) trade weighted 102.3 98.8 108.1 104.4 104.7 91.1 86.0 87.7 88.3 83.4 87.8
Bilateral US real exchange rate (index, August 1992=100) 111.3 110.2 114.4 109.7 107.3 95.4 87.8 85.5 88.1 86.6 90.9
External terms of trade 90 99 110 100 100 86 94 89 104 85 72
Interest rates
Real deposit rate (%) -25.7% -8.4% -8.4% -2.4% -17.7% -18.0% 15.1% 24.5% 7.7% -1.8% 3.1%
Real lending rate (%) -22.1% -3.2% 5.4% 7.1% 1.9% -6.1% 22.4% 36.2% 20.2% 8.8% 16.0%
Spread (%) 3.6% 5.2% 13.8% 9.6% 19.6% 11.9% 7.3% 11.7% 12.5% 10.6% 12.9%
Fiscal balance
Fiscal Surplus (+)/Deficit (-)  (% GDP) Non-fin. public sector -5.3% -1.2% 0.5% -0.6% -1.2% -0.1% 0.6% -1.1% -3.0% -2.6% -6.1%
Public spending (% GDP) Non-fin. public sector 26.8% 27.4% 26.6% 26.0% 26.9% 25.0% 23.8% 26.6% 27.3% 26.3% 25.7%
    Current expenditures 21.4% 20.1% 19.5% 18.6% 19.6% 18.2% 17.3% 20.1% 19.7% 20.0% 20.5%
    Investment 5.4% 7.3% 7.1% 7.4% 7.3% 6.8% 6.5% 6.6% 7.6% 6.3% 5.1%
Public revenues (% GDP) Non-fin. public sector 21.5% 26.2% 27.1% 25.4% 25.8% 24.9% 24.4% 25.5% 24.4% 23.8% 19.6%
     Oil revenues 7.7% 9.4% 11.6% 8.8% 9.6% 8.7% 7.2% 7.4% 8.2% 6.4% 4.6%
     Non-oil revenues 13.8% 16.7% 15.5% 16.6% 16.2% 16.3% 17.2% 18.1% 16.1% 17.4% 15.0%
Other macroeconomic indicators
GDP growth (%) 10.5% 0.3% 3.0% 5.0% 3.6% 2.0% 4.3% 2.3% 2.0% 3.4% 1.4%
     Traded goods sector -3.6% 2.3% 5.7% 4.1% 3.2% 6.0% 3.1% 1.8% 3.7% 0.6%
     Non-traded goods sector 3.1% 1.4% 3.2% 2.6% 1.1% 2.7% 1.5% 2.6% 2.6% 2.0%
GDP per capita growth (%) 7.9% -2.1% 0.7% 2.6% 1.3% -0.2% 2.1% 0.2% -0.1% 1.3% -0.7%
Inflation rate (CPI) (%) 58.1% 75.7% 48.5% 48.7% 54.6% 45.0% 25.9% 22.9% 24.4% 30.7% 45.0%
Real minimum wage (Index, 1988=100; November is reference month) 100.0 82.1 69.2 63.6 69.5 76.6 95.7 106.8 115.0 109.6 106.2
Urban unemployment rate (%) 6.5% 7.9% 6.1% 8.5% 8.9% 8.3% 7.1% 6.9% 10.4% 9.2% 11.5%
Monetary expansion (M1) (%) 32.3% 38.1% 52.2% 46.5% 44.5% 49.4% 35.7% 12.7% 35.4% 29.7% 8.7%
Monetary expansion (M2) (%) 40.0% 45.8% 63.9% 58.1% 56.9% 52.8% 56.8% 41.8% 43.8% 35.1% 24.7%
Financial intermediation 
   Money supply (M2/GDP) 20.7% 17.6% 18.2% 19.2% 19.1% 20.6% 24.3% 27.3% 29.8% 30.9% 28.4%
   Financial intermediation ratio (M2/M1) 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.9 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.6
Cuadro A.2a:  Ecuador: Descomposicion del crecimiento de la productividad, 1988-97: Sectores No agricolas y Empleo Urbano
DESCOMPOSICION DEL CRECIMIENTO DE LA PRODUCTIVIDAD LABORAL
a.  Cambios en el producto y el empleo
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
A.- Producto (Xi) Estructura productiva, no agricola (Xi/X)
Agricultura 29416 30230 32080 33988 35154 34555 35887 37033 38334 39887 39577
Petroleo y minas 23964 21642 21442 23251 24599 27298 30200 31348 30756 31824 31825 16.9% 15.3% 15.1% 15.7% 16.1% 17.3% 18.4% 18.7% 18.0%
Industria manufacturera 29312 27858 28055 28951 29989 30731 32085 32794 33885 35082 36018 20.6% 19.7% 19.7% 19.6% 19.6% 19.5% 19.5% 19.5% 19.8%
Electricidad, gas y agua 2721 2899 2781 2841 2919 2980 3071 2956 3038 3110 3213 1.9% 2.1% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8%
Construcción 6024 6264 5333 5274 5256 5032 5299 5225 5356 5505 5726 4.2% 4.4% 3.7% 3.6% 3.4% 3.2% 3.2% 3.1% 3.1%
Comercio, hoteles y rest. 25925 26470 27469 28557 29420 29919 31000 31679 33067 34147 34852 18.2% 18.8% 19.3% 19.3% 19.2% 19.0% 18.8% 18.9% 19.3%
Transporte y comuncaciones 13620 14700 15362 16289 17223 17992 18746 19313 19909 20677 21036 9.6% 10.4% 10.8% 11.0% 11.3% 11.4% 11.4% 11.5% 11.6%
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas 14169 14496 14708 15145 15495 15644 16089 16349 16660 16969 17335 10.0% 10.3% 10.3% 10.2% 10.1% 9.9% 9.8% 9.7% 9.7%
Otros servicios 26477 26824 27268 27770 28090 27899 27995 28262 28410 28781 29261 18.6% 19.0% 19.1% 18.8% 18.4% 17.7% 17.0% 16.8% 16.6%
Otros componentes PIB 4114 4812 7033 8572 9291 9397 9778 10115 9920 10767 11163
TOTAL PIB 175742 176195 181531 190638 197436 201447 210150 215074 219335 226749 230006
TOTAL PIB No Agricola 142212 141153 142418 148078 152991 157495 164485 167926 171081 176095 179266 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Transables (no agricolas) 53276 49500 49497 52202 54588 58029 62285 64142 64641 66906 67843 37.5% 35.1% 34.8% 35.3% 35.7% 36.8% 37.9% 38.2% 37.8%
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol) 29312 27858 28055 28951 29989 30731 32085 32794 33885 35082 36018 20.6% 19.7% 19.7% 19.6% 19.6% 19.5% 19.5% 19.5% 19.8%
No Transables 88936 91653 92921 95876 98403 99466 102200 103784 106440 109189 111423 62.5% 64.9% 65.2% 64.7% 64.3% 63.2% 62.1% 61.8% 62.2%
B.- Empleo urbano (Li) Estructura sectoral de empleo (Li/L)
Agricultura 115907 137449 162293 193668 185379 201299 194544 184387 201326 219010
Petroleo y minas 17389 18959 14972 12901 13261 19075 17791 17557 18623 11386 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6%
Industria manufacturera 383523 401854 430386 448658 467940 493312 437128 441880 459926 512384 18.9% 18.7% 19.4% 18.4% 17.7% 19.1% 16.7% 15.6% 15.9%
Electricidad, gas y agua 17297 19727 24385 22765 18206 19860 13125 19443 12435 10546 0.9% 0.9% 1.1% 0.9% 0.7% 0.8% 0.5% 0.7% 0.4%
Construcción 159623 159715 174535 179318 193475 174102 184485 192733 192581 205431 7.9% 7.4% 7.9% 7.4% 7.3% 6.8% 7.0% 6.8% 6.7%
Comercio, hoteles y rest. 551676 599515 643680 738970 849322 814976 841594 943834 924504 919961 27.1% 27.9% 29.0% 30.3% 32.1% 31.6% 32.1% 33.4% 32.0%
Transporte y comuncaciones 124202 128131 134118 147895 153377 161654 161214 165378 179588 185167 6.1% 6.0% 6.0% 6.1% 5.8% 6.3% 6.1% 5.9% 6.2%
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas 102684 116467 110340 119586 140787 125575 117892 137650 144527 148350 5.1% 5.4% 5.0% 4.9% 5.3% 4.9% 4.5% 4.9% 5.0%
Otros servicios 676646 707183 689269 766337 805631 770527 851583 905393 954718 1033529 33.3% 32.9% 31.0% 31.5% 30.5% 29.9% 32.4% 32.1% 33.1%
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL Empleo urbano 2148947 2289000 2383978 2630098 2827378 2780380 2819356 3008255 3088228 3245764
TOTAL Empleo No Agricola 2033040 2151551 2221685 2436430 2641999 2579081 2624812 2823868 2886902 3026754 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Transables (no agricolas) 400912 420813 445358 461559 481201 512387 454919 459437 478549 523770 19.7% 19.6% 20.0% 18.9% 18.2% 19.9% 17.3% 16.3% 16.6%
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol) 383523 401854 430386 448658 467940 493312 437128 441880 459926 512384 18.9% 18.7% 19.4% 18.4% 17.7% 19.1% 16.7% 15.6% 15.9%
No Transables 1632128 1730738 1776327 1974871 2160798 2066694 2169893 2364431 2408353 2502984 80.3% 80.4% 80.0% 81.1% 81.8% 80.1% 82.7% 83.7% 83.4%
C.- Productividad Sectorial (Xi/Li) (miles de sucres de 1975) Ponderadores de reasignacion laboral (Xi/X - Li/L)
Agricultura
Petroleo y minas 1378.1 1141.5 1432.1 1802.3 1855.0 1431.1 1697.5 1785.5 1651.5 2795.0 16.0% 14.5% 14.4% 15.2% 15.6% 16.6% 17.7% 18.0% 17.3%
Industria manufacturera 76.4 69.3 65.2 64.5 64.1 62.3 73.4 74.2 73.7 68.5 1.7% 1.1% 0.3% 1.1% 1.9% 0.4% 2.9% 3.9% 3.9%
Electricidad, gas y agua 157.3 147.0 114.0 124.8 160.3 150.1 234.0 152.0 244.3 294.9 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 1.0% 1.2% 1.1% 1.4% 1.1% 1.3%
Construcción 37.7 39.2 30.6 29.4 27.2 28.9 28.7 27.1 27.8 26.8 -3.6% -3.0% -4.1% -3.8% -3.9% -3.6% -3.8% -3.7% -3.5%
Comercio, hoteles y rest. 47.0 44.2 42.7 38.6 34.6 36.7 36.8 33.6 35.8 37.1 -8.9% -9.1% -9.7% -11.0% -12.9% -12.6% -13.2% -14.6% -12.7%
Transporte y comuncaciones 109.7 114.7 114.5 110.1 112.3 111.3 116.3 116.8 110.9 111.7 3.5% 4.5% 4.7% 4.9% 5.5% 5.2% 5.3% 5.6% 5.4%
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas 138.0 124.5 133.3 126.6 110.1 124.6 136.5 118.8 115.3 114.4 4.9% 4.9% 5.4% 5.3% 4.8% 5.1% 5.3% 4.9% 4.7%
Otros servicios 39.1 37.9 39.6 36.2 34.9 36.2 32.9 31.2 29.8 27.8 -14.7% -13.9% -11.9% -12.7% -12.1% -12.2% -15.4% -15.2% -16.5%
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL PIB
TOTAL PIB No Agricola 70.0 65.6 64.1 60.8 57.9 61.1 62.7 59.5 59.3 58.2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Transables (no agricolas) 132.9 117.6 111.1 113.1 113.4 113.3 136.9 139.6 135.1 127.7 17.7% 15.5% 14.7% 16.3% 17.5% 17.0% 20.5% 21.9% 21.2%
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol) 76.4 69.3 65.2 64.5 64.1 62.3 73.4 74.2 73.7 68.5 1.7% 1.1% 0.3% 1.1% 1.9% 0.4% 2.9% 3.9% 3.9%
No Transables 54.5 53.0 52.3 48.5 45.5 48.1 47.1 43.9 44.2 43.6 -17.7% -15.5% -14.7% -16.3% -17.5% -17.0% -20.5% -21.9% -21.2%
Cuadro A.2a:  Ecuador: Descomposicion del crecimiento de la productividad, 1988-97: Sectores No agricolas y Empleo Urbano
a.  Cambios en el producto y el empleo
A.-
Agricultura
Petroleo y minas
Industria manufacturera
Electricidad, gas y agua
Construcción
Comercio, hoteles y rest.
Transporte y comuncaciones
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas
Otros servicios 
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL PIB
TOTAL PIB No Agricola
Transables (no agricolas)
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol)
No Transables
B.-
Agricultura
Petroleo y minas
Industria manufacturera
Electricidad, gas y agua
Construcción
Comercio, hoteles y rest.
Transporte y comuncaciones
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas
Otros servicios 
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL Empleo urbano
TOTAL Empleo No Agricola
Transables (no agricolas)
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol)
No Transables
C.-
Agricultura
Petroleo y minas
Industria manufacturera
Electricidad, gas y agua
Construcción
Comercio, hoteles y rest.
Transporte y comuncaciones
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas
Otros servicios 
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL PIB
TOTAL PIB No Agricola
Transables (no agricolas)
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol)
No Transables
1997 1998 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1992-97
Crecimiento PIB (dXi/Xi)
2.8% 6.1% 5.9% 3.4% -1.7% 3.9% 3.2% 3.5% 4.1% -0.8% 2.6%
18.1% 17.8% -9.7% -0.9% 8.4% 5.8% 11.0% 10.6% 3.8% -1.9% 3.5% 0.0% 5.3%
19.9% 20.1% -5.0% 0.7% 3.2% 3.6% 2.5% 4.4% 2.2% 3.3% 3.5% 2.7% 3.2%
1.8% 1.8% 6.5% -4.1% 2.2% 2.7% 2.1% 3.1% -3.7% 2.8% 2.4% 3.3% 1.3%
3.1% 3.2% 4.0% -14.9% -1.1% -0.3% -4.3% 5.3% -1.4% 2.5% 2.8% 4.0% 0.9%
19.4% 19.4% 2.1% 3.8% 4.0% 3.0% 1.7% 3.6% 2.2% 4.4% 3.3% 2.1% 3.0%
11.7% 11.7% 7.9% 4.5% 6.0% 5.7% 4.5% 4.2% 3.0% 3.1% 3.9% 1.7% 3.7%
9.6% 9.7% 2.3% 1.5% 3.0% 2.3% 1.0% 2.8% 1.6% 1.9% 1.9% 2.2% 1.8%
16.3% 16.3% 1.3% 1.7% 1.8% 1.2% -0.7% 0.3% 1.0% 0.5% 1.3% 1.7% 0.5%
17.0% 46.2% 21.9% 8.4% 1.1% 4.1% 3.4% -1.9% 8.5% 3.7% 3.0%
0.3% 3.0% 5.0% 3.6% 2.0% 4.3% 2.3% 2.0% 3.4% 1.4% 2.8%
100.0% 100.0% -0.7% 0.9% 4.0% 3.3% 2.9% 4.4% 2.1% 1.9% 2.9% 1.8% 2.9%
38.0% 37.8% -7.1% 0.0% 5.5% 4.6% 6.3% 7.3% 3.0% 0.8% 3.5% 1.4% 4.2%
19.9% 20.1% -5.0% 0.7% 3.2% 3.6% 2.5% 4.4% 2.2% 3.3% 3.5% 2.7% 3.2%
62.0% 62.2% 3.1% 1.4% 3.2% 2.6% 1.1% 2.7% 1.5% 2.6% 2.6% 2.0% 2.1%
Crecimiento Empleo Urbano (dLi/Li)
18.6% 18.1% 19.3% -4.3% 8.6% -3.4% -5.2% 9.2% 8.8% 3.4%
0.4% 9.0% -21.0% -13.8% 2.8% 43.8% -6.7% -1.3% 6.1% -38.9% -3.0%
16.9% 4.8% 7.1% 4.2% 4.3% 5.4% -11.4% 1.1% 4.1% 11.4% 1.8%
0.3% 14.0% 23.6% -6.6% -20.0% 9.1% -33.9% 48.1% -36.0% -15.2% -10.3%
6.8% 0.1% 9.3% 2.7% 7.9% -10.0% 6.0% 4.5% -0.1% 6.7% 1.2%
30.4% 8.7% 7.4% 14.8% 14.9% -4.0% 3.3% 12.1% -2.0% -0.5% 1.6%
6.1% 3.2% 4.7% 10.3% 3.7% 5.4% -0.3% 2.6% 8.6% 3.1% 3.8%
4.9% 13.4% -5.3% 8.4% 17.7% -10.8% -6.1% 16.8% 5.0% 2.6% 1.1%
34.1% 4.5% -2.5% 11.2% 5.1% -4.4% 10.5% 6.3% 5.4% 8.3% 5.1%
6.5% 4.1% 10.3% 7.5% -1.7% 1.4% 6.7% 2.7% 5.1% 2.8%
100.0% 5.8% 3.3% 9.7% 8.4% -2.4% 1.8% 7.6% 2.2% 4.8% 2.8%
17.3% 5.0% 5.8% 3.6% 4.3% 6.5% -11.2% 1.0% 4.2% 9.4% 1.7%
16.9% 4.8% 7.1% 4.2% 4.3% 5.4% -11.4% 1.1% 4.1% 11.4% 1.8%
82.7% 6.0% 2.6% 11.2% 9.4% -4.4% 5.0% 9.0% 1.9% 3.9% 3.0%
Crecimiento Productividad (dXi/Xi - dLi/Li)
17.7% -17.2% 25.5% 25.8% 2.9% -22.9% 18.6% 5.2% -7.5% 69.2% 8.5%
3.0% -9.3% -6.0% -1.0% -0.7% -2.8% 17.8% 1.1% -0.7% -7.1% 1.3%
1.4% -6.6% -22.4% 9.4% 28.5% -6.4% 55.9% -35.0% 60.7% 20.7% 13.0%
-3.7% 3.9% -22.1% -3.7% -7.6% 6.4% -0.6% -5.6% 2.6% -3.6% -0.3%
-11.0% -6.0% -3.3% -9.4% -10.4% 6.0% 0.3% -8.9% 6.6% 3.8% 1.4%
5.6% 4.6% -0.2% -3.8% 2.0% -0.9% 4.5% 0.4% -5.1% 0.7% -0.1%
4.7% -9.8% 7.1% -5.0% -13.1% 13.2% 9.5% -13.0% -2.9% -0.8% 0.8%
-17.8% -3.1% 4.3% -8.4% -3.8% 3.8% -9.2% -5.0% -4.7% -6.4% -4.4%
0.0% -6.2% -2.3% -5.2% -4.7% 5.5% 2.6% -5.1% -0.3% -1.8% 0.1%
20.7% -11.5% -5.5% 1.8% 0.3% -0.2% 20.9% 2.0% -3.2% -5.4% 2.4%
3.0% -9.3% -6.0% -1.0% -0.7% -2.8% 17.8% 1.1% -0.7% -7.1% 1.3%
-20.7% -2.8% -1.2% -7.2% -6.2% 5.7% -2.1% -6.8% 0.7% -1.3% -0.9%
Cuadro A.2b:  Ecuador: Descomposicion del crecimiento de la productividad, 1988-97: Sectores No agricolas y Empleo Urbano
DESCOMPOSICION DEL CRECIMIENTO DE LA PRODUCTIVIDAD LABORAL
b. Descomposicion de la productividad
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1992-97 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
A.- Producto (Xi/X)Xi*) Empleo {(Li/L)li*}
Agricultura
Petroleo y minas -1.5% -0.1% 1.3% 0.9% 1.9% 2.0% 0.7% -0.3% 0.6% 1.0% 0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0%
Industria manufacturera -1.0% 0.1% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.9% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.9% 1.4% 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% -1.9%
Electricidad, gas y agua 0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% -0.1% -0.1% 0.1% -0.2%
Construcción 0.2% -0.6% 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.2% 0.6% -0.7% 0.4%
Comercio, hoteles y rest. 0.4% 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.3% 0.7% 0.4% 0.8% 0.6% 0.6% 2.4% 2.1% 4.5% 4.8% -1.3% 1.0%
Transporte y comuncaciones 0.8% 0.5% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.3% 0.6% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0%
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.7% -0.3% 0.4% 0.9% -0.5% -0.3%
Otros servicios 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% -0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 1.5% -0.8% 3.5% 1.6% -1.3% 3.4%
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL PIB
TOTAL PIB No Agricola -0.4% 1.0% 4.0% 3.3% 3.1% 4.5% 2.1% 1.9% 2.9% 2.9% 5.9% 3.6% 9.9% 8.7% -2.0% 2.5%
Transables (no agricolas) -2.5% 0.0% 1.9% 1.6% 2.3% 2.8% 1.1% 0.3% 1.3% 1.6% 1.0% 1.2% 0.7% 0.8% 1.3% -1.9%
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol) -1.0% 0.1% 0.6% 0.7% 0.5% 0.9% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.9% 1.4% 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% -1.9%
No Transables 2.0% 0.9% 2.1% 1.7% 0.7% 1.7% 1.0% 1.6% 1.6% 1.3% 4.9% 2.1% 9.1% 7.7% -3.5% 4.1%
B.- Productividad Sectorial Ponderada por el empleo {suma(Li/L)pi*} Termino de Reasignación {suma[(Xi/X)-(Li/L)}Xi*}
Agricultura
Petroleo y minas -0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% -0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% -1.4% -0.1% 1.3% 0.9% 1.8% 1.9%
Industria manufacturera -1.7% -1.2% -0.2% -0.1% -0.5% 3.0% 0.2% -0.1% -1.2% 0.2% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
Electricidad, gas y agua -0.1% -0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.3% -0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Construcción 0.3% -1.7% -0.3% -0.6% 0.4% 0.0% -0.4% 0.2% -0.2% 0.0% -0.1% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% -0.2%
Comercio, hoteles y rest. -1.7% -1.0% -2.9% -3.3% 1.9% 0.1% -3.0% 2.1% 1.1% 0.4% -0.2% -0.4% -0.4% -0.4% -0.2% -0.5%
Transporte y comuncaciones 0.3% 0.0% -0.2% 0.1% -0.1% 0.3% 0.0% -0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2%
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas -0.5% 0.4% -0.2% -0.7% 0.6% 0.4% -0.6% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2%
Otros servicios -1.0% 1.3% -2.6% -1.2% 1.1% -3.0% -1.6% -1.5% -2.2% -1.5% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.1% 0.1% -0.1%
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL PIB
TOTAL PIB No Agricola -4.6% -2.3% -6.2% -5.5% 3.3% 1.2% -5.6% 0.4% -2.1% -0.8% -1.4% 0.2% 1.2% 0.9% 2.2% 1.7%
Transables (no agricolas) -2.2% -1.1% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 3.6% 0.3% -0.5% -0.9% 0.3% -1.1% 0.0% 0.9% 0.8% 1.1% 1.5%
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol) -1.7% -1.2% -0.2% -0.1% -0.5% 3.0% 0.2% -0.1% -1.2% 0.2% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
No Transables -2.3% -1.0% -5.8% -5.1% 4.6% -1.8% -5.7% 0.6% -1.1% -1.0% -0.5% -0.2% -0.5% -0.5% -0.2% -0.6%
C.- Productividad Sectorial Ponderada por el producto {suma(Xi/X)pi*} Termino de Reasignación {suma[(Xi/X)-(Li/L)}Li*}
Agricultura
Petroleo y minas -2.6% 3.8% 4.1% 0.5% -4.0% 3.4% 1.0% -1.3% 12.5% 1.5% 1.3% -3.0% -2.1% 0.4% 7.3% -1.2%
Industria manufacturera -1.8% -1.2% -0.2% -0.1% -0.5% 3.5% 0.2% -0.1% -1.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% -0.3%
Electricidad, gas y agua -0.1% -0.4% 0.2% 0.5% -0.1% 1.0% -0.6% 1.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% -0.1% -0.2% 0.1% -0.5%
Construcción 0.2% -0.8% -0.1% -0.3% 0.2% 0.0% -0.2% 0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.4% -0.1% -0.3% 0.4% -0.2%
Comercio, hoteles y rest. -1.1% -0.6% -1.8% -2.0% 1.1% 0.1% -1.7% 1.3% 0.7% 0.3% -0.8% -0.7% -1.6% -1.9% 0.5% -0.4%
Transporte y comuncaciones 0.5% 0.0% -0.4% 0.2% -0.1% 0.5% 0.0% -0.6% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0%
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas -1.0% 0.7% -0.5% -1.3% 1.3% 0.9% -1.3% -0.3% -0.1% 0.1% 0.7% -0.3% 0.4% 0.9% -0.5% -0.3%
Otros servicios -0.6% 0.8% -1.6% -0.7% 0.7% -1.6% -0.8% -0.8% -1.0% -0.7% -0.6% 0.3% -1.4% -0.6% 0.5% -1.6%
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL PIB
TOTAL PIB No Agricola -6.7% 2.3% -0.4% -3.2% -1.4% 7.9% -3.3% -0.7% 11.1% 1.6% 0.9% -3.7% -4.3% -1.5% 8.5% -4.6%
Transables (no agricolas) -4.0% -1.9% 0.6% 0.1% -0.1% 7.9% 0.8% -1.2% -2.1% 1.8% 0.8% 0.9% 0.6% 0.7% 1.1% -2.3%
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol) -1.8% -1.2% -0.2% -0.1% -0.5% 3.5% 0.2% -0.1% -1.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% -0.3%
No Transables -1.8% -0.8% -4.7% -4.0% 3.6% -1.3% -4.2% 0.4% -0.8% -0.2% -0.9% -0.4% -1.8% -1.6% 0.7% -1.0%
No Transables
Cuadro A.2b:  Ecuador: Descomposicion del crecimiento de la productividad, 1988-97: Sectores No agricolas y Empleo Urbano
b. Descomposicion de la productividad
A.-
Agricultura
Petroleo y minas
Industria manufacturera
Electricidad, gas y agua
Construcción
Comercio, hoteles y rest.
Transporte y comuncaciones
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas
Otros servicios 
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL PIB
TOTAL PIB No Agricola
Transables (no agricolas)
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol)
No Transables
B.-
Agricultura
Petroleo y minas
Industria manufacturera
Electricidad, gas y agua
Construcción
Comercio, hoteles y rest.
Transporte y comuncaciones
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas
Otros servicios 
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL PIB
TOTAL PIB No Agricola
Transables (no agricolas)
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol)
No Transables
C.-
Agricultura
Petroleo y minas
Industria manufacturera
Electricidad, gas y agua
Construcción
Comercio, hoteles y rest.
Transporte y comuncaciones
Servicios Financieros y a Empresas
Otros servicios 
Otros componentes PIB
TOTAL PIB
TOTAL PIB No Agricola
Transables (no agricolas)
Transables (no agricolas, no petrol)
No Transables
No Transables
1995 1996 1997 1992-97 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1992-97
Total { p*= suma[(Xi/X)Xi*-(Li/L)Li*]}
0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% -1.6% 0.0% 1.4% 0.9% 1.6% 2.0% 0.7% -0.4% 0.8% 1.0%
0.2% 0.7% 1.9% 0.3% -1.9% -1.2% -0.2% -0.1% -0.6% 2.8% 0.3% 0.0% -1.2% 0.3%
0.3% -0.2% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% -0.4% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
0.3% 0.0% 0.5% 0.1% 0.2% -1.3% -0.2% -0.6% 0.5% -0.2% -0.3% 0.1% -0.4% -0.1%
4.1% -0.7% -0.1% 0.5% -2.0% -1.4% -3.7% -4.2% 1.6% -0.4% -3.6% 1.5% 0.8% 0.1%
0.2% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% -0.2% 0.3% 0.2%
0.8% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% -0.5% 0.4% -0.1% -0.7% 0.6% 0.6% -0.7% -0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
2.0% 1.8% 2.8% 1.7% -1.2% 1.1% -3.2% -1.4% 1.2% -3.4% -1.9% -1.7% -2.6% -1.7%
7.9% 2.5% 5.2% 2.8% -6.4% -2.4% -5.8% -5.1% 5.2% 2.3% -5.6% -0.4% -2.0% 0.1%
0.2% 0.7% 1.6% 0.3% -3.5% -1.2% 1.2% 0.9% 1.0% 4.7% 1.0% -0.4% -0.3% 1.3%
0.2% 0.7% 1.9% 0.3% -1.9% -1.2% -0.2% -0.1% -0.6% 2.8% 0.3% 0.0% -1.2% 0.3%
7.5% 1.5% 3.2% 2.5% -2.9% -1.2% -7.0% -6.0% 4.2% -2.4% -6.5% 0.0% -1.6% -1.2%
Termino de Reasignación {suma[(Xi/X)-(Li/L)}Xi*} Productividad Laboral Total {[suma(Li/L)pi*] + [suma[(Xi/X)-(Li/L)]Xi*]}
0.7% -0.3% 0.6% 0.9% -1.6% 0.0% 1.4% 0.9% 1.7% 2.0% 0.7% -0.4% 0.9% 1.0%
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% -1.8% -1.2% -0.1% -0.1% -0.5% 3.1% 0.3% 0.0% -1.1% 0.3%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.3% -0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
0.1% -0.1% -0.1% 0.0% 0.2% -1.1% -0.2% -0.5% 0.6% -0.2% -0.3% 0.1% -0.3% -0.1%
-0.3% -0.6% -0.4% -0.3% -1.9% -1.3% -3.3% -3.7% 1.7% -0.4% -3.3% 1.5% 0.8% 0.1%
0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% -0.1% 0.3% 0.2%
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% -0.4% 0.4% -0.1% -0.6% 0.7% 0.6% -0.6% -0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
-0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.1% -1.2% 1.1% -2.9% -1.3% 1.2% -3.0% -1.8% -1.6% -2.4% -1.6%
0.6% -0.6% 0.4% 0.9% -6.0% -2.1% -5.1% -4.6% 5.5% 2.8% -5.0% -0.3% -1.8% 0.1%
0.7% 0.2% 0.7% 1.0% -3.3% -1.1% 1.2% 0.9% 1.0% 5.1% 1.0% -0.4% -0.2% 1.3%
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% -1.8% -1.2% -0.1% -0.1% -0.5% 3.1% 0.3% 0.0% -1.1% 0.3%
-0.3% -0.5% -0.5% -0.1% -2.7% -1.2% -6.3% -5.5% 4.4% -2.3% -6.0% 0.0% -1.6% -1.2%
Termino de Reasignación {suma[(Xi/X)-(Li/L)}Li*} Productividad Laboral Total {[suma(Xi/XL)pi*]+[suma[(Xi/X)-(Li/L)]Li*]}
-0.2% 1.1% -6.9% -0.5% -1.3% 0.8% 2.0% 0.9% 3.3% 2.2% 0.7% -0.3% 5.6% 1.0%
0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% -1.8% -1.2% -0.1% -0.1% -0.5% 3.2% 0.3% 0.0% -1.1% 0.3%
0.5% -0.5% -0.2% -0.1% 0.0% -0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.6% -0.1% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1%
-0.2% 0.0% -0.2% 0.0% 0.2% -1.2% -0.2% -0.6% 0.6% -0.2% -0.3% 0.1% -0.4% -0.1%
-1.8% 0.3% 0.1% -0.2% -1.9% -1.4% -3.5% -3.9% 1.6% -0.4% -3.4% 1.5% 0.8% 0.1%
0.1% 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.5% 0.2% -0.1% 0.3% 0.2%
0.8% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% -0.4% 0.5% -0.1% -0.5% 0.8% 0.6% -0.4% -0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
-1.0% -0.9% -1.5% -0.9% -1.2% 1.1% -3.0% -1.3% 1.2% -3.2% -1.8% -1.7% -2.5% -1.6%
-1.6% 0.8% -8.1% -1.5% -5.8% -2.2% -5.3% -4.8% 5.4% 3.3% -5.2% -0.3% -1.7% 0.2%
0.2% 0.9% 2.0% -0.5% -3.3% -1.1% 1.2% 0.9% 1.0% 5.6% 1.0% -0.3% -0.1% 1.3%
0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% -1.8% -1.2% -0.1% -0.1% -0.5% 3.2% 0.3% 0.0% -1.1% 0.5%
-2.0% -0.4% -0.8% -1.0% -2.8% -1.2% -6.5% -5.6% 4.3% -2.4% -6.2% 0.0% -1.6% -1.2%
Table A.3: Decomposition of Productivity Growth, 1990-95: all sectors
Output growth
Employment 
growth
Productivity 
growth
Weights of 
productivity 
change
Employment 
reallocation
1990-95 dXi/Xi dLi/Li ri* (Xi/X).ri* (Xi/Xi -Li/L).Li*
Agriculture 2.9% 1.6% 1.3% 0.2% -0.2%
Oil and mining 7.9% 3.5% 4.3% 0.7% 0.5%
Manufacturing 3.2% 0.7% 2.5% 0.4% 0.0%
Electricity, gas and water 1.2% 1.9% -0.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Construction -0.4% 2.5% -2.8% -0.1% -0.1%
Commerce 2.9% 6.9% -3.7% -0.6% -0.5%
Transport and communications 4.7% 5.7% -0.9% -0.1% 0.3%
Financial services 2.1% -6.7% 9.4% 0.8% -0.5%
Other services 0.7% 3.3% -2.5% -0.3% -0.5%
Total 3.3% 3.1% 0.2% 1.0% -0.7%
Traded goods 4.4% 1.3% 3.0% 1.3% 0.4%
  Non-oil, traded goods 3.2% 0.7% 2.5% 0.4% 0.0%
Non-traded goods 2.2% 4.4% -2.1% -0.3% -1.1%
Source:  Central Bank, national accounts; INEC, Population census 1990; INEC, Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida 1995
Note:     Employment data of 1990 census adjusted for underreporting of female and rural participation rates to obtain
             greater comparability with 1995 LSMS survey data.
Table A.4:     Ecuador: Urban employment by occupational category, 1988-97
(percent of Economically Active Population in Urban Areas)
1988 1992 1996 1997
Wage earners 55.7% 51.3% 51.9% 53.7%
   public sector 17.4% 14.2% 13.2% 13.0%
   private sector 38.3% 37.1% 38.7% 40.7%
Self-employed 33.2% 37.4% 37.2% 35.5%
   self-employed/owners 24.0% 27.0% 26.7% 26.3%
   family workers 5.4% 6.2% 5.8% 4.3%
   domestic servants 3.8% 4.2% 4.7% 4.9%
Employers 7.6% 7.5% 6.9% 7.2%
Unspecified 3.6% 3.8% 3.9% 3.5%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: INEC, Encuestas de Empleo Urbano
